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stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

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place, contains nothing borrowed from experience, and which, secondly, refers to an object that<br />

cannot be determined or given any experience” (CPR A533/B561). Instead, we ought to oppose<br />

the intelligible in practice to the sensible in practice. This is why Kant calls the intelligible in the<br />

Critique <strong>of</strong> Practical Reason the supersensible. However, once we oppose the supersensible in<br />

practice to the sensible in practice it is clear what it must be. “Whatever in an object <strong>of</strong> the senses<br />

is not itself appearance, I entitle intelligible. If, therefore, that which in the sensible world must<br />

be regarded as appearance has in itself a faculty which is not an object <strong>of</strong> sensible intuition, but<br />

through which it can be the cause <strong>of</strong> appearances, the causality <strong>of</strong> this being can be regarded<br />

from two points <strong>of</strong> view. Regarded as the causality <strong>of</strong> a thing in itself, it is intelligible in its<br />

action; regarded as the causality <strong>of</strong> an appearance in the world <strong>of</strong> sense, it is sensible in its<br />

effects” (CPR A538/B566). In practice ‘the intelligible’ refers to an ability. But what ability is<br />

that? In opposition to the sensible, that is, to the feeling <strong>of</strong> pleasure, the supersensible is reason.<br />

“Sometimes, however, we find, or at least believe that we find, that the ideas <strong>of</strong> reason have in<br />

actual fact proved their causality in respect <strong>of</strong> the actions <strong>of</strong> men, as appearances; and that these<br />

actions have taken place, not because they were determined by empirical causes, but because<br />

they were determined by grounds <strong>of</strong> reason” (CPR A55/B578). Therefore, the causality <strong>of</strong> the<br />

intelligible character is determined by reason. Reason acts freely. But this point needs to be<br />

specified further.<br />

To say that the causality <strong>of</strong> the intelligible character is not determined and is outside the<br />

series <strong>of</strong> empirical conditions means that it is not determined by the laws <strong>of</strong> nature. However,<br />

that does not mean that the intelligible is not determined by any laws. Kant argues that every<br />

causality and therefore even the causality <strong>of</strong> the intelligible character is determined by laws.<br />

“Every efficient cause must have a character, that is, a law <strong>of</strong> its causality, without which it<br />

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