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stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

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sensible. (This is why Deleuze talks about the sensible and organic syntheses that precede the<br />

conceptual syn<strong>thesis</strong>). Deleuze calls this being <strong>of</strong> the sensible the sign. “The object <strong>of</strong> encounter,<br />

on the other hand, really gives rise to sensibility with regard to a given sense. It is not an<br />

aistheton but an aistheteon. It is not a quality but a sign. It is not a sensible being but the being <strong>of</strong><br />

the sensible” (DR 139-40). What exactly is this sign? For Kant the sensible being is what is given<br />

in the manifold. However, Deleuze argues, the being <strong>of</strong> the sensible is what gives sensible being.<br />

“It is not the given but that by which the given is given” (DR 140). Deleuze argues that the sign<br />

is intensity. In “Deleuze-Bergson: an Ontology <strong>of</strong> the Virtual” Boundas writes: “what is it that<br />

our sense ought to sense that they cannot (empirically) sense? Well, as Kant would have said, the<br />

manifold is given; but, for Deleuze, that by means <strong>of</strong> which the manifold is given is intensity”<br />

(Boundas 89). Deleuze <strong>of</strong>ten argues that to the extent that the Cogito is in charge <strong>of</strong> the faculty<br />

<strong>of</strong> sensibility, the human being cannot sense intensity.<br />

The faculty <strong>of</strong> sensibility that is dominated by the faculty <strong>of</strong> the understanding cannot<br />

sense intensity. “It is therefore in a certain sense the imperceptible [insensible]. It is<br />

imperceptible precisely from the point <strong>of</strong> view <strong>of</strong> recognition - in other words, from the point <strong>of</strong><br />

view <strong>of</strong> an empirical exercise <strong>of</strong> the senses in which sensibility grasps only that which also could<br />

be grasped by other faculties, and is related within the context <strong>of</strong> a common sense to an object<br />

which also must be apprehended by other faculties” (DR 140). Specifically, to the extent that the<br />

faculty <strong>of</strong> sensibility is dominated by the faculty <strong>of</strong> the understanding it can only sense intensity<br />

as extensity. This is why Kant claims that intuitions without concepts are blind. Daniel W. Smith<br />

makes this point in “Deleuze’s Theory <strong>of</strong> Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality.” “In<br />

empirical experience, to be sure, we know only intensities or forms <strong>of</strong> energy that are already<br />

localized and distributed in extended space: intensity is inseparable from a process <strong>of</strong> extension<br />

219

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