stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

Difference and repetition
Deleuze often suggests that philosophy is an ontology. One might think that for this reason
Deleuze is a dogmatic philosopher, a metaphysician. Often, Deleuze himself seems to say as
much. But I argue that this is not the case. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant talks about the
object from the perspective of the Cogito which is to say that he talks about the appearance. But
when Deleuze talks about difference he is no less critical than Kant. The only difference is in
their respective starting points. In Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition James Williams
writes that “the Deleuzian appeal to the transcendental is, thus, very different from the Kantian.
It turns on the question where they begin, what they take as given…” (Williams 123). In fact, if
the Copernican Counter-Revolution is to ground the Copernican Revolution, Deleuze must be a
critical philosopher. In this regard it is important to note that Deleuze does not say that
philosophy is an ontology without at the same time saying that being is univocal. “Philosophy
merges with ontology, but ontology merges with the univocity of Being” (LS 179). But why is
being univocal? The passive self does not arrive to being with a concept in hand. This means that
the passive self does not confront an object but is rather immersed in it. In “Six Notes on the
Percept” François Zourabichivili argues that “mind is the membrane of the external world, rather
than an autonomous gaze directed towards it. Everyone may therefore say ‘I am the world, or a
piece of the world’…” (Zourabichivili 197). Actually, to the extent that the passive self does not
arrive with the concept in hand means that we cannot even talk about the object. Perhaps the
most that we can say is that the passive self is immersed. But even this is saying too much. To
the extent that the self is passive in other words that it does not arrive with the concept in hand
means that this self is indistinguishable from its immersion, simply, that the passive self is its
immersion. But even this extreme way of putting it also says too much. To the extent that the
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