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stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

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positive modes <strong>of</strong> knowledge which belong to the domain <strong>of</strong> pure reason, and which, it may be,<br />

give occasion to error solely owing to misunderstanding, while yet in actual fact they form the<br />

goal towards which reason is directing its efforts” (CPR A796/B824). What use <strong>of</strong> reason is that?<br />

“If it is proved that there is pure reason, its use is alone immanent; the empirically conditioned<br />

use, which lays claim to absolute rule, is on the contrary transcendent and expresses itself in<br />

demands and commands that go quite beyond its sphere – precisely the opposite relation from<br />

what could be said <strong>of</strong> pure reason in its speculative use” (CPrR 5:16). This different use <strong>of</strong><br />

reason is practical. “Reason has a presentiment <strong>of</strong> objects which possess a great interest for it.<br />

But when it follows the path <strong>of</strong> pure speculation, in order to approach them, they fly before it.<br />

Presumably it may look for better fortune in the only other path which still remains open to it,<br />

that <strong>of</strong> its practical employment” (CPR A796/B824). “Consequently,” Kant continues, “if there<br />

be any correct employment <strong>of</strong> pure reason, in which case there must be a canon <strong>of</strong> its<br />

employment, the canon will deal not with the speculative but with the practical employment <strong>of</strong><br />

reason”(CPR A797/B825). The theoretical use <strong>of</strong> reason thinks the thing in itself. However, the<br />

practical use <strong>of</strong> reason knows the thing in itself as freedom. “It is really the concept <strong>of</strong> freedom<br />

that, among all the ideas <strong>of</strong> pure speculative reason, alone provides such a great extension in the<br />

field <strong>of</strong> the supersensible, though only with respect to practical cognition” (CPrR 5:103). But we<br />

must stress that this practical knowledge is radically different than theoretical knowledge. “For,<br />

the moral law is not concerned with the cognition <strong>of</strong> the constitution <strong>of</strong> objects that may be given<br />

to reason from elsewhere but rather with a cognition ins<strong>of</strong>ar as it can itself become the ground <strong>of</strong><br />

the existence <strong>of</strong> objects and ins<strong>of</strong>ar as reason, by this cognition, has causality in a rational being,<br />

that is, pure reason, which can be regarded as a faculty immediately determining the will” (CPrR<br />

5:46). Reason in practice does not know freedom as an object. Instead, reason in practice knows<br />

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