02.09.2013 Views

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

things in themselves. But what is that knowledge? Practical knowledge does not determine the<br />

objective validity <strong>of</strong> things in themselves from the point <strong>of</strong> view <strong>of</strong> representational knowledge:<br />

“[practical] reason, in thus proceeding, requires no assistance from speculative reason…” (CPR<br />

Bxxv). In other words, it is not the case that reason knows the thing in itself representationally<br />

when it is used practically. If that were the case practical knowledge would not be knowledge<br />

that is different in kind than representation. But it is. “Now if reason is to be a factor in these<br />

sciences something in them must be known a priori, and this knowledge may be related to its<br />

object in one or other <strong>of</strong> two ways, either as merely determining it and its concept (which must<br />

be supplied from elsewhere) or as also making it actual. The former is theoretical, the latter<br />

practical knowledge <strong>of</strong> reason” (CPR Bx). That reason knows the thing itself practically means<br />

that it actualizes it. In this sense, practical reason actually knows the thing in itself that is<br />

different in kind from the thing itself that the representational reason does not know. In other<br />

words, practical reason knows the thing in itself that is not the transcendental object.<br />

Reason thinks three things. These are God, immortality and freedom. However, it is<br />

important to note that already in the preface to the B edition <strong>of</strong> the Critique <strong>of</strong> Pure Reason Kant<br />

develops the positive value <strong>of</strong> reason not in relation to all three <strong>of</strong> these thoughts, but only in<br />

relation to one <strong>of</strong> them, namely freedom (CPR xvii-xxxi). “But though I cannot know, I can yet<br />

think freedom” (CPR Bxxviii). On the other hand, Kant argues, “the discussion as to the positive<br />

advantage <strong>of</strong> critical principles <strong>of</strong> pure reason can be similarly developed in regard to the<br />

concept <strong>of</strong> God and <strong>of</strong> the simple nature <strong>of</strong> our soul; but for the sake <strong>of</strong> brevity such further<br />

discussion may be omitted” (CPR Bxxx). However, by the time <strong>of</strong> the Critique <strong>of</strong> Practical<br />

Reason Kant recognizes that such a discussion cannot actually be developed. Reason does think<br />

three thoughts, but it is only one <strong>of</strong> them, namely freedom that reason knows practically. “But<br />

70

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!