02.09.2013 Views

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

(Korsgaard 190). It is however the sense in which Wood takes humanity to be the value that<br />

makes his interpretation <strong>of</strong> Kant’s practical philosophy problematic. Wood writes that for Kant<br />

“rational nature is described as an end – an end in itself. Kant calls it a self-sufficient,’<br />

‘independent,’ or ‘selfstanding’ (selbstständig) end, in contrast to an ‘end to be produced.’ It is<br />

an end in the sense <strong>of</strong> something for the sake <strong>of</strong> which we act” (Wood 85). In this sense, Wood<br />

claims, the value <strong>of</strong> humanity does not succeed action. Instead, it precedes action. “In the claim<br />

that rational nature is an end in itself, rational nature is not being thought <strong>of</strong> a state <strong>of</strong> affairs to<br />

be produced by an action. Instead, an ‘end in itself’ is something already existing whose value<br />

grounds even our pursuit <strong>of</strong> the ends produced by our actions” (Wood 85). For this reason, Wood<br />

argues that Kant’s practical philosophy does not begin with action. Instead, it begins with the<br />

value <strong>of</strong> humanity that determines action. “This value is to motivate obedience to a categorical<br />

imperative – a principle that rationality constrains us without presupposing any end to be<br />

produced” (Wood 86). What is the problem with this interpretation <strong>of</strong> Kant’s practical<br />

philosophy?<br />

What Wood says about Kant’s practical philosophy is something that I think anyone who<br />

has given the slightest thought to the nature <strong>of</strong> practice understands immediately. We do not just<br />

act. Instead, we consider the value <strong>of</strong> others and ourselves as the moral standard against which<br />

we act. This is <strong>of</strong> course not to say that every time we act we have to again and again think about<br />

this value. Over time, we simply become the kinds <strong>of</strong> beings who act in the name <strong>of</strong> these values.<br />

All this is well. However, I doubt that it has much to do with Kant’s practical philosophy. In fact<br />

if it did, Kant’s practical philosophy would be open to a very serious objection. Wood himself<br />

recognizes this objection. “Kant’s arguments for the bold <strong>thesis</strong> that humanity is an end in itself<br />

are terse and obscure…We may have to face the fact that the mere claim that human beings have<br />

85

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!