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stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

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(CPR Bxxi). In fact, Kant argues, reason does know the thing in itself practically. “At least this is<br />

so, immediately we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary practical employment <strong>of</strong><br />

pure reason—the moral—in which it inevitably goes beyond the limits <strong>of</strong> sensibility” (CPR<br />

Bxxv). “[Reason]” in other words, “is in itself not only a theoretical but also a practical faculty,<br />

and as such is not bound down to natural conditions” (CPR B425). However, that we cannot<br />

know things in themselves theoretically but can know them practically does not mean that<br />

practice succeeds where theory fails. In a sense, the two kinds <strong>of</strong> knowledge run two different<br />

kinds <strong>of</strong> businesses.<br />

“To know an object I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its actuality as<br />

attested by experience, or a priori by means <strong>of</strong> reason. But I can think whatever I please,<br />

provided only that I do not contradict myself, that is, provided my concept is a possible thought.<br />

This suffices for the possibility <strong>of</strong> the concept, even though I may not be able to answer for there<br />

being, in the sum <strong>of</strong> all possibilities, an object corresponding to it” (CPR Bxxviin). Kant argues<br />

that it is not enough from the perspective <strong>of</strong> either representational or practical knowledge just to<br />

think the thing in itself in order for it to have objective validity. “But something more is required<br />

before I can ascribe to such a concept objective validity that is, real possibility; the former<br />

possibility is merely logical” (CPR Bxxviin). However, Kant does argue that there is not only<br />

one way <strong>of</strong> determining the objective validity <strong>of</strong> things in themselves, namely, theoretical<br />

knowledge; instead, there is also another way, namely practical knowledge. “This something<br />

more need not, however, be sought in the theoretical sources <strong>of</strong> knowledge; it may lie in those<br />

that are practical” (CPR Bxxviin). In other words, that representational knowledge denies<br />

objective validity to things in themselves does not mean that all knowledge denies objective<br />

validity to things in themselves. Practical knowledge in fact affirms the objective validity <strong>of</strong><br />

69

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