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A Case Study in NASA-DoD - The Black Vault

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-vii-<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of the L-AE11 spacecraft dur<strong>in</strong>g the second phase<br />

of the study led to a superior procurement option that did not necessarily<br />

<strong>in</strong>clude the NMS or AEM. <strong>The</strong> L-AEM spacecraft is very similar<br />

to both the Air Force STPSS and the proposed SMMS.<br />

S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>NASA</strong> had decl<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

to proceed with the SMMS development <strong>in</strong> response to the Air<br />

Force-proposed memorandum of agreement, the results of the second phase<br />

of this case study provided the Air Force Space Test Program Office<br />

with justification for develop<strong>in</strong>g its own standard spacecraft, i.e.,<br />

the L-AEM. At the present time, the Air Force is request<strong>in</strong>g bids from<br />

<strong>in</strong>dustry for designs of the spacecraft to support its next two missions.<br />

Whether or not the result<strong>in</strong>g spacecraft designs will represent the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g<br />

of an Air Force standard spacecraft design must await the outcome<br />

of a number of future Air Force decisions.<br />

In any event, it<br />

appears that the possibility of procur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>NASA</strong> spacecraft for the Air<br />

Force Space Test Program will be determ<strong>in</strong>ed case by case.<br />

F<strong>in</strong>ally, some observations are presented concern<strong>in</strong>g the prospects<br />

and problems of apply<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>NASA</strong>-<strong>DoD</strong> cooperation experience to other<br />

situations. This is done <strong>in</strong> recognition of the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>terdepartmental and <strong>in</strong>ternational cooperation as a means of either<br />

achiev<strong>in</strong>g economic efficiency or of undertak<strong>in</strong>g projects that one<br />

agency or country cannot support on its own. <strong>The</strong> two pr<strong>in</strong>cipal underly<strong>in</strong>g<br />

factors that were essential to the ultimate success of the <strong>NASA</strong>-<br />

<strong>DoD</strong> cooperation experience are: (1) a common subset of missions and<br />

resources--manpower, data, spacecraft, launch vehicles, facilities,<br />

etc.--where cooperation was possible and desirable, and (2) a common<br />

organizational responsibility to the Executive Branch (the President<br />

and the Bureau of the Budget), which <strong>in</strong> turn was responsible to<br />

Congress. But even given these two pr<strong>in</strong>cipal factors, it took four<br />

to five years before successful cooperation and the formal organizational<br />

mach<strong>in</strong>ery became a reality for <strong>NASA</strong> and <strong>DoD</strong>. <strong>The</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>cipal<br />

impediment to establish<strong>in</strong>g coord<strong>in</strong>ation earlier was the open disagreement<br />

between President Eisenhower and the Congress over the need for<br />

<strong>NASA</strong>-<strong>DoD</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ation and their respective space missions. However,<br />

dur<strong>in</strong>g the Kennedy Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, cooperation between <strong>NASA</strong>-<strong>DoD</strong> became<br />

<strong>in</strong>stitutionalized after the Soviets' first manned orbital flight.

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