A Case Study in NASA-DoD - The Black Vault
A Case Study in NASA-DoD - The Black Vault
A Case Study in NASA-DoD - The Black Vault
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
-89-<br />
Air Force Headquarters to <strong>NASA</strong> a Memorandum of Agreement on the Procurement<br />
of USAF Designated &=all Mti-Mission Modular Spacecraft<br />
Systems Between the National Aeronautics and Space Adm<strong>in</strong>istration and<br />
the Department of Defense (See Appendix J).<br />
This memorandum essentially called for <strong>NASA</strong> to underwrite the development<br />
of the SMMS hav<strong>in</strong>g capabilities compatible with the Air Force<br />
requirements but determ<strong>in</strong>ed jo<strong>in</strong>tly by <strong>NASA</strong> and <strong>DoD</strong>. <strong>The</strong> <strong>DoD</strong> agreed<br />
to purchase a block of the SMMS for the STP missions, pay<strong>in</strong>g only the<br />
recurr<strong>in</strong>g costs of the SlMS. <strong>The</strong> Air Force agreed to make payments to<br />
<strong>NASA</strong> three years <strong>in</strong> advance for subsequent spacecraft delivery. <strong>The</strong><br />
purpose of an advance payment of $1 million was to relieve <strong>NASA</strong>'s immediate<br />
budget problems that prevented <strong>NASA</strong> from <strong>in</strong>itiat<strong>in</strong>g the development<br />
of the SMMS with FY 77 <strong>NASA</strong> funds. Such a delayed development<br />
would jeopardize the Air Force Space Test Program's <strong>in</strong>itial shuttle<br />
schedule.<br />
<strong>NASA</strong>'s rejo<strong>in</strong>der to the Air Force-proposed Memorandum of Agreement<br />
stated that (1) a jo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>NASA</strong>/USAF work<strong>in</strong>g group review<strong>in</strong>g the SMMS concluded<br />
that an agreement can be reached on a set of jo<strong>in</strong>t technical<br />
requirements; (2) <strong>NASA</strong> is <strong>in</strong> no position to <strong>in</strong>itiate the SlMS program<br />
because <strong>NASA</strong> mission requirements will not support new-start fund<strong>in</strong>g<br />
for either FY 77 or FY 78; and (3) based on the results of the first<br />
phase of the Rand study, <strong>NASA</strong> would make available the MIS to meet the<br />
Air Forceys March 1979 shuttle launch date, and would consider upgrad<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the AEM to meet the Air Force requirement, but that <strong>NASA</strong> was unable to<br />
fund such a modification. It should be noted that no specific mention<br />
was made about the Air Force-proposed advanced fund<strong>in</strong>g of $1 million.<br />
As of September 1976, the Air Force was not <strong>in</strong>tend<strong>in</strong>g to follow up<br />
<strong>NASA</strong>'s offer because <strong>NASA</strong> apparently was not will<strong>in</strong>g to quote a price<br />
for the MMS and because <strong>NASA</strong>'s offer left the Air Force without assurance<br />
that the upgraded AEM would ever be developed by <strong>NASA</strong>. In the latter<br />
case, the Air Force could be fac<strong>in</strong>g a total program cost of about $100<br />
million more than if the upgraded AE4 was developed. Given a procurement<br />
<strong>The</strong> estimated program cost for the 1MS/upgraded AEM option is $146.<br />
million, as compared to $222 million for the pure STPSS option, $263<br />
million for the MMS option, or $240 million for the AEM/fS option (see<br />
Sec. IV, Table 12).