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A Case Study in NASA-DoD - The Black Vault

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-10-<br />

<strong>The</strong> fundamental effect of the concern generated by the<br />

Russian success was recognition with<strong>in</strong> the U.S. Government<br />

that the entire spectrum of space technology had<br />

to be given the same high priority afforded the ballistic<br />

missile program. A high priority space program <strong>in</strong> turn<br />

called for strong, new government organizations.( 1 1 )<br />

Although President Eisenhower allowed the military to assume a<br />

larger role <strong>in</strong> launch<strong>in</strong>g the first U.S. satellite than that orig<strong>in</strong>ally<br />

planned, and never apparently really grasped the <strong>in</strong>ternational political<br />

significance of the Soviet technological successes, he steadfastly<br />

held to the policy that the U.S. space program should be scientific,<br />

peaceful, and under civilian control. President Eisenhower's<br />

view was that space provided no military significance and that it was<br />

important to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a clear separation. Furthermore, he was determ<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

not to disturb the balance between military expenditures and a<br />

healthy nondefense economy, which meant that the space program would<br />

not be fully supported. (9) This position was ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed even <strong>in</strong> the<br />

face of the negative recommendations of the Gaither Committee that<br />

were published before the launch<strong>in</strong>g of Sputnik. <strong>The</strong> Gaither Committee<br />

had been appo<strong>in</strong>ted by Eisenhower <strong>in</strong> the spr<strong>in</strong>g of 1957 to evaluate<br />

proposals for a $40 billion program of civil defense shelters.<br />

committee broadened its charter to produce an overall assessment of<br />

the state of national defense. <strong>The</strong> committee concluded that "...if<br />

the United States did not change its policies, it was <strong>in</strong> danger of becom<strong>in</strong>g<br />

a second-class power ... ," a conclusion that President Eisenhower<br />

chose to ignore until forced to consider it by the Sputnik launches. ( 1 2 )<br />

*<br />

Although attempts by Eisenhower to conta<strong>in</strong> the political losses<br />

because of Sputnik were strongly motivated by his personal judgment of<br />

its limited significance, it is also likely that:<br />

<strong>The</strong><br />

Eisenhowerts position resulted from careful deliberation--Sputnik<br />

I was conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g evidence of the Soviet<br />

breakthrough <strong>in</strong> long-range missile power. If Eisenhower<br />

For example, the President told an October 9, 1957, press conference<br />

that "<strong>The</strong> Russians have only put one small ball <strong>in</strong> the air."<br />

Repeatedly, the President and his associates asserted that the United<br />

States would not become <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> a "space race" with the Soviets.

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