A Case Study in NASA-DoD - The Black Vault
A Case Study in NASA-DoD - The Black Vault
A Case Study in NASA-DoD - The Black Vault
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-10-<br />
<strong>The</strong> fundamental effect of the concern generated by the<br />
Russian success was recognition with<strong>in</strong> the U.S. Government<br />
that the entire spectrum of space technology had<br />
to be given the same high priority afforded the ballistic<br />
missile program. A high priority space program <strong>in</strong> turn<br />
called for strong, new government organizations.( 1 1 )<br />
Although President Eisenhower allowed the military to assume a<br />
larger role <strong>in</strong> launch<strong>in</strong>g the first U.S. satellite than that orig<strong>in</strong>ally<br />
planned, and never apparently really grasped the <strong>in</strong>ternational political<br />
significance of the Soviet technological successes, he steadfastly<br />
held to the policy that the U.S. space program should be scientific,<br />
peaceful, and under civilian control. President Eisenhower's<br />
view was that space provided no military significance and that it was<br />
important to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a clear separation. Furthermore, he was determ<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
not to disturb the balance between military expenditures and a<br />
healthy nondefense economy, which meant that the space program would<br />
not be fully supported. (9) This position was ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed even <strong>in</strong> the<br />
face of the negative recommendations of the Gaither Committee that<br />
were published before the launch<strong>in</strong>g of Sputnik. <strong>The</strong> Gaither Committee<br />
had been appo<strong>in</strong>ted by Eisenhower <strong>in</strong> the spr<strong>in</strong>g of 1957 to evaluate<br />
proposals for a $40 billion program of civil defense shelters.<br />
committee broadened its charter to produce an overall assessment of<br />
the state of national defense. <strong>The</strong> committee concluded that "...if<br />
the United States did not change its policies, it was <strong>in</strong> danger of becom<strong>in</strong>g<br />
a second-class power ... ," a conclusion that President Eisenhower<br />
chose to ignore until forced to consider it by the Sputnik launches. ( 1 2 )<br />
*<br />
Although attempts by Eisenhower to conta<strong>in</strong> the political losses<br />
because of Sputnik were strongly motivated by his personal judgment of<br />
its limited significance, it is also likely that:<br />
<strong>The</strong><br />
Eisenhowerts position resulted from careful deliberation--Sputnik<br />
I was conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g evidence of the Soviet<br />
breakthrough <strong>in</strong> long-range missile power. If Eisenhower<br />
For example, the President told an October 9, 1957, press conference<br />
that "<strong>The</strong> Russians have only put one small ball <strong>in</strong> the air."<br />
Repeatedly, the President and his associates asserted that the United<br />
States would not become <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> a "space race" with the Soviets.