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A Case Study in NASA-DoD - The Black Vault

A Case Study in NASA-DoD - The Black Vault

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-100-<br />

shared hardware and facilities, and common management and procurement<br />

procedures.<br />

However, even where the <strong>in</strong>terests were common, it was not<br />

easy to achieve a high degree of cooperation. <strong>The</strong> <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ation to create<br />

separate management procedures was as strong as the desire to build<br />

separate facilities and support organizations.<br />

Congress recognized the potential for <strong>NASA</strong> and <strong>DoD</strong> to create duplicate<br />

capabilities, and thus specified <strong>in</strong> the Space Act of 1958 that...<br />

<strong>in</strong> order to keep the costs of the U.S. Space program as low as possible,<br />

unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities, and equipment should be<br />

avoided by close cooperation among Federal agencies.... This statement<br />

* of Congressional <strong>in</strong>tent, along with the provision for organizational<br />

arrangements to oversee the <strong>NASA</strong>-<strong>DoD</strong> relationship, provided the legislative<br />

basis for such cooperation.<br />

Even with these factors, it took four to five years before the organizational<br />

structure for cooperation was developed and <strong>in</strong>stitutionalized<br />

as part of the <strong>NASA</strong> and D-.D standard operat<strong>in</strong>g procedure.<br />

Situations<br />

that do not <strong>in</strong>clude these two categories of factors could<br />

expect to encounter possibly even more difficulty <strong>in</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g a<br />

cooperative relationship.<br />

THE DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSFERRING NACA EXPERIENCE TO <strong>NASA</strong><br />

<strong>The</strong> transferral of organizational experience from one situation<br />

to another is generally much more difficult than anticipated. For<br />

<strong>in</strong>stance, dur<strong>in</strong>g the debate between Congress and the Executive Branch<br />

on the formulation of <strong>NASA</strong>, it was often suggested that the experience<br />

of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) was directly<br />

applicable to the new space agency and should be used as an organizational<br />

model for <strong>NASA</strong>. In 1959, NACA, employ<strong>in</strong>g 8000 scientists,<br />

eng<strong>in</strong>eers, and other personnel and operat<strong>in</strong>g several major research<br />

and test<strong>in</strong>g facilities, had already demonstrated many years of service<br />

to the aircraft <strong>in</strong>dustry and the military services. In 1952 it began<br />

to study the mechanics and problems of space flight and was the agency<br />

responsible for such technical contributions as the blunt nose design<br />

<strong>The</strong> Civilian Military Liaison Committee (CMLC)<br />

Aeronautics and Space Council.<br />

and the National

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