Warriors in Peace Operations - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army
Warriors in Peace Operations - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army
Warriors in Peace Operations - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army
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One piece of frustrated cargo def<strong>in</strong>ed the term. The<br />
Armor Launched Vehicle Bridges were too large to get to<br />
Bosnia by rail. Although Brigadier General James P.<br />
O’Neal, the ADC-S, had suggested months before that we<br />
send such cargo by barge, that idea had been dismissed by<br />
someone up the cha<strong>in</strong> outside the division. Instead, there<br />
was <strong>in</strong>sistence we send everyth<strong>in</strong>g by rail. The bottom l<strong>in</strong>e<br />
was that the bridges could not be shipped there <strong>in</strong> time for<br />
use dur<strong>in</strong>g the river cross<strong>in</strong>g. We argued with several<br />
people at corps and 21st TAACOM about disassembl<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
bridges for shipment. We <strong>in</strong>sisted we could not do it and get<br />
them reassembled <strong>in</strong> time to meet the requirements. We<br />
ended up shipp<strong>in</strong>g six bridges, I believe, by C-17 cargo<br />
aircraft.<br />
Another difficult issue we had to deal with almost<br />
immediately was determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g priority for movement of<br />
cargo and units by air from Ramste<strong>in</strong> Air Base. There was a<br />
board process for determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g priority for air. However,<br />
there was a difference between USAREUR movement board<br />
decisions and priorities on the airfield. The Division G-3,<br />
Lieutenant Colonel Ed Kane, sent Major Tom Muir, the G-3<br />
Air, to Ramste<strong>in</strong> to represent the Task Force and to ensure<br />
our priorities were executed. It was a constant struggle.<br />
Part of the problem was the requirement that everyth<strong>in</strong>g be<br />
done on JOPES; however, the lowest-level JOPES term<strong>in</strong>al<br />
was <strong>in</strong> Heidelberg at corps Headquarters. The primary<br />
JOPES operator, Mr. Oliphant, was almost a one-man<br />
show. Moreover, units were responsible for fill<strong>in</strong>g out<br />
JOPES worksheets so that he could <strong>in</strong>put <strong>in</strong>formation from<br />
them <strong>in</strong>to the computer. As movements changed, it required<br />
a stream of officers go<strong>in</strong>g to Heidelberg to sit down with Mr.<br />
Oliphant to update JOPES <strong>in</strong>put. This was very disruptive<br />
for units try<strong>in</strong>g to deploy. The next problem was what was<br />
happen<strong>in</strong>g on the ground at Ramste<strong>in</strong>. Sometimes, Air<br />
Force personnel would load lower-priority pallets before the<br />
higher-priority pallets. Muir’s efforts were <strong>in</strong>valuable as he<br />
helped get critical items flown to Tuzla <strong>in</strong> the early days.<br />
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