Warriors in Peace Operations - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

USAREUR forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina were by European
rail overland convoy.
The A/DACG missions turned ugly on December 20
when weather precluded navigation of the land and river
routes that were the primary modes for deployment of the
1st Armored Division. Rail strikes in France and internal
sabotage by German rail workers resulted in insufficient
railcars to meet the demanding workload imposed by the
U.S. deployment. As a result, air deployment became the
immediate fix for a deployment scenario that was rapidly
falling behind schedule.
Both the 69th TC and the 15th TTD successfully handled
the shift in primary deployment transport modes with the
normal confusion and inconvenience associated with
last-minute changes. The combination of long hours,
teamwork, and strong NCOs helped these two units process
4,000 passengers, 2,500 pieces of rolling stock, and over
40,000 short tons of cargo through their APOEs. The 69th
TC and 15th TTD remained in place until relieved by 1st
Theater Army Movement Control Agency (TAMCA) in early
February 1996. But their relief was short in duration. In
March, I began deploying the units to the Intermediate
Staging Base at Taszar, Hungary, as relief for the 70th TC
and 260th TTD that deployed to the Balkans in December.
OPCON Issues.
I mentioned earlier that the 70th TC and 260th TTD
were placed under the operational control of the 181st TB
prior to deploying to the Balkans. That did not negate my
responsibility to support my two subordinate units. From
the time they deployed, the two unit commanders looked to
me for moral and physical support. Almost daily, the 28th
TB sent a tractor/trailer combination via EAGLE EXPRESS
to rapidly reinforce the units with re-supply and emergency
repair parts. The 181st TB did not have M915 tractors,
forklifts, or “Yard dogs” within their Modified Table of
Organization and Equipment; therefore, the 70th TC and
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