Warriors in Peace Operations - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

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three times. The first time some key leaders were called away (although the training went just fine without them), the second time the Air Force was not able to participate, and the third time was OK, but we had fired most of our key ammunition in the first two exercises. Needless to say, the pressure on the brigade staff was enormous. Simultaneously, we were conducting an accelerated fielding of SINCGARS radios. It was obvious the brigade TOC was not as well organized as it needed to be, but given the conditions I decided not to interfere and just try to help them get through the immediate problems. An interesting event occurred during that week that had an impact on my future in a different way. Major General Nash called me up and asked me to come to the division Command Post (CP) and spend some time with him. I watched activities in the CP for a while, then watched a training Joint Military Commission that Major General Nash conducted, and then went back into the CP to talk some more. The major impression I had was how disorganized the CP seemed to be—far too many tasks for the people on hand and not organized functionally. Major General Nash had a van that had a large round table in it that was his “thinking area.” But it also had a videoteleconference (VTC) terminal in it and was on a major route between vans in the command post. A vivid remembrance I have was the stern, rather caustic chewing out Major General Nash gave the G-3 over there being no one monitoring and taking notes on a VTC the Corps was conducting. The relationship between the two was obviously not very close or warm. The other vivid remembrance I have is how exhausted everyone was in the CP. They were all obviously working their hearts out. I watched a Battle Update Briefing (BUB) where Major General Nash received an update on the situation. Rather than using a mapboard, most of the briefing was done presenting a series of Powerpoint slides on a large monitor. I remember a long line of staff officers coming into a very crowded van, stumbling over each other getting in and out, 92
not knowing the answers to the dozens of questions Major General Nash kept firing, and then asking for a staff officer who was not in the van (“G-2!!!, get the G-2 in here . . .,” followed by a long wait getting the G-2 back in the van . . . then a question, and the G-2 having to reply, “I do not know sir, I’ll find out”). I’m not sure who was more frustrated, Major General Nash over the staff’s inability to anticipate and know the answers to his questions or the staff’s frustration with a CG who never seemed to be satisfied. It seemed to me the staff was whipped. Later toward the end of the day, Major General Nash asked me what I thought of the CP and what they should do there. I made two comments that I can recall. One was it seemed the Command Post needed to be reorganized along the functional lines necessary for this kind of mission. The other was that I thought the staff needed a little rest more than anything else. I do not know if it had anything to do with what I said, but the next weekend the division sent most of the staff home for a weekend off. By the time they traveled there and back, there was not much rest, but it was well-intentioned. I have concluded since then that what was really happening that day was that I was being interviewed for my next job. Later in the week, Major General Nash sat down with me and told me he was not making an offer, but if he asked, what would I think of becoming the division G-3. I said I was very flattered, and that if he had to have an answer right then I would give him one, but knowing the implications, I would prefer to talk to my wife first. He said that was a good idea. I’m not sure if he really thought it was or not, but eventually I would wind up being the G-3 after I changed command. My greatest lesson from this period was how traumatic it is for those who must stay behind when you split up a unit and deploy part of it. The emotions and trauma are very difficult, demanding positive self-help to mitigate them. Such self-help is very hard to accomplish, given the 93
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WARRIORS IN PEACE OPERATIONS Edited
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CONTENTS FOREWORD .................
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FOREWORD The Personal Experience Mo
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seldom practiced. The actual practi
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BATTALION COMMAND I assumed command
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all training, maintenance, and othe
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company training and log efforts, a
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the USAREUR staff was thought up an
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new times. Ops Center at the battal
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like the Jewish exodus wandering ar
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marvelous job of coordinating the e
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it. They did not want us there or n
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containers as well. I told him I un
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promptly chambered a round in his p
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techniques, we found the railhead a
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answer. He quickly made himself and
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Tacsat systems with two independent
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CHAPTER 3 THE BLUE FALCONS IN BOSNI
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monograph. My omission of such elem
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their advance around the safe haven
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unusual. In today’s environment,
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He also provided his timeline for J
Page 45 and 46: Within about an hour I was reminded
Page 47 and 48: eter. Even along these paths, I had
Page 49 and 50: for deployment. The pre-deployment
Page 51 and 52: a rehearsal for leaders, using a ve
Page 53 and 54: • Heavy weapons platoon from E Co
Page 55 and 56: The Blue Falcons exited the aircraf
Page 57 and 58: esponsibility for the base security
Page 59 and 60: sandbagged for force protection. Th
Page 61 and 62: Weather continued to deteriorate ov
Page 63 and 64: east-west roads crossing the Zone o
Page 65 and 66: needed from his forces. This coordi
Page 67 and 68: This COP was manned by a reinforced
Page 69 and 70: attalion commander was executing a
Page 71 and 72: creativity in accomplishing every a
Page 73 and 74: On February 11, TF 3-325 began coor
Page 75: their security. Hence, the title em
Page 88 and 89: deployed with the battalion to the
Page 90 and 91: at a confrontation going on at a ch
Page 92 and 93: he was deadly serious. I was convin
Page 94 and 95: As I reflected on the emotions I wa
Page 98 and 99: pressure, intensity, and rigor of a
Page 100 and 101: gaining the sense of teamwork and s
Page 102 and 103: from 4-67, and now three tank plato
Page 104 and 105: Although the setup had changed in t
Page 106 and 107: trains per day to that point, thus
Page 108 and 109: soldier why there were differences
Page 110 and 111: One piece of frustrated cargo defin
Page 112 and 113: soldiers who deployed into an area
Page 114 and 115: support. After several false starts
Page 116 and 117: Group leaders, who were not paid pr
Page 118 and 119: Another lesson I learned was the ve
Page 120 and 121: We also developed a rotational gunn
Page 122 and 123: CHAPTER 5 COMMANDING A FIELD ARTILL
Page 124 and 125: Target Acquisition Battery (B/25 FA
Page 126 and 127: Rather than the anticipated three w
Page 128 and 129: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS
Page 130 and 131: usiness taking their husbands away
Page 132 and 133: transportation, shopping, and perso
Page 137 and 138: were required to carry these 12 rul
Page 139 and 140: The remaining combat elements of Ch
Page 141 and 142: As we departed Baumholder, I felt c
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Page 145 and 146: Figure 7. 1st Armored Division AOR.
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forcing Service Battery to expend a
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Zvornik to regain control of the se
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likely a key storage site for a mec
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deployment. When offered the opport
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was due to retire from the Russian
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equipment for turn-in both at Baumh
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assume the FSG advisor role for the
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assigned weapons. It was a great co
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This created a daily stop at every
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(at all times) and constant reporti
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CONCLUSION The opportunity for batt
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A. He did not countermand the major
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CHAPTER 6 THE 28TH TRANSPORTATION B
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deactivation of the 53rd Transporta
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factors allowing us to stay ahead o
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drivers could not operate a motor v
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tied up with A/DACGS, CSCs, EAGLE E
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heat I received from the families b
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260th TTD relied entirely on the 28
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When I split my battalion headquart
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no IG or congressional inquiries re
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unit home to Wuerzburg, Germany. Un
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Drivers were also beginning to show
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unnecessary wear and tear on his un
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mileage during my first year in com
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logistics operations in support of
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The 127th ASB is a Combat Service S
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along with a myriad of situations t
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the battalion movement was not sche
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INITIAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS, ISB Aft
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SUPPORT PLAN The aviation brigade w
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commander while assigned to the 1AD
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The ground/air refuel and supply fu
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Force protection became a necessary
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military. As early as 1993, some si
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command, because the National Comma
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soldiers up at 1130 for a formal se
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actions—all at the same time. Onc
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eing, load-bearing equipment (LBE)
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teams and had one team erect the EM
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was ours. Once we received this add
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hospital area and our consequent ab
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our soldiers in a U.S. facility, bu
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• Treated 19,899 Outpatients •
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and Steve Walker, commanders of the
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the unique tasks required for the u
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could do to change it now. The good
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THE SUBORDINATE REAR DETACHMENT COM
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to Grafenwoehr for deployment-speci
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Those were some of the major missio
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kept track of the classified inform
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considerable time updating the book
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Fortunately, we never had to deal w
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• Good rear detachment commanders
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AFTERWORD Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II
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Colin Powell’s philosophy—we we
show all

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