Warriors in Peace Operations - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

not been given a “stop loss” authorization, so we had to
rotate soldiers to replace normal losses. The new
replacements had to be equipped and trained prior to
deployment. Because of the limited number of training
allocations per unit and shortages of some items of issue, it
was a constant battle to get soldiers prepared for
deployment. We were also trying to take a reasonable
approach, and let new soldiers at least get their families
settled into quarters, as we were encouraging them to bring
their families when they moved to Germany. This was
because of the negative impact that fewer and fewer
families would have on the communities of deployed units.
As a result of the difficulties, individual replacements
were managed at an unbelievably high level. The corps rear
detachment (called Task Force VICTORY) was managing
down to individual level. We were sending reports to them
on the particular shoe sizes individuals needed. This is
exactly opposite to the mission order approach Captain
Dave Korty had so successfully executed in creating the
frustrated cargo movement control center. We wasted a lot
of human energy because of this different approach. It
worked, but I believe a more mission-oriented method
would have worked better.
By March, rear detachment operations were smoothing
out, and we began concentrating on putting units back
together again. We could not approach it with a businessas-usual
attitude. Units had rear detachment-associated
missions, such as guarding installations, that prevented us
from having a normal training program.
However, we started incorporating training events into
these missions. One example I recall was moving some
tanks to Kirchgoens during a guard operation so that the
unit could conduct Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Tests while
guarding the installation. The company commanders were
very creative in developing training plans to take advantage
of available time.
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