Warriors in Peace Operations - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

and burden sharing, one may expect to confront political
agendas that give new meaning to the term “unity of effort.”
Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Hammond is the only
contributor who took his unit to and brought it back from
the Bosnian theater. His training in connection with that
experience is worth remembering, but the reader should
note that except for the dispersed nature of his unit’s
operations, its daily activities were quite similar to the
established tactics, techniques, and procedures required in
wartime. There were obvious exceptions—camouflage was
replaced by a conscious effort to achieve visibility. But it is
not too difficult to recover from that practice.
I could not help marveling at the ability of these units
and their soldiers and leaders to adapt effectively to the
vagaries of rapidly changing policies. That they were able to
do so speaks volumes about the effectiveness of the training
and leadership they have been receiving. That they have
reacted effectively as a mostly married force says a great
deal for the strength of their families and their willingness
to make sacrifices. The nation owes a debt of gratitude to
them all, and to those who are following in their footsteps, it
owes more than gratitude. It owes them time and resources.
Since it cannot give them time, it must give them resources.
Finally, on a philosophical note, many of the criteria laid
down in the so-called “Weinberger Doctrine” of 1984 are
evident in this operation. And even though his criteria were
never intended to be enshrined as doctrine, they were at
least to be viewed as informal policy—a kind of guide for
determining when to go to war. Whether the Bosnian
intervention was in our “vital national interest” or not
depends upon how we look at war in the Balkans—and most
of us fear it. Once before, in events leading to the Great War,
it leapt the boundaries of that international backwater.
When we put our troops in Bosnia, we did so with military
and political objectives that were as clear as the situation
allowed. Further, we knew full well how to accomplish our
initial military objectives and—taking a page from General
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