Warriors in Peace Operations - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army
Warriors in Peace Operations - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army
Warriors in Peace Operations - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army
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The deployment was an unbelievable operation. The<br />
conflict between headquarters, the resentment built up<br />
based on conflicts, and the personal turmoil affect<strong>in</strong>g<br />
soldiers and families were significant and to some degree<br />
avoidable. Although the mission was accomplished, it was<br />
not nearly as “successful” or pretty as those who write hyped<br />
articles for various publications attest.<br />
Most of the problems for the deployment were <strong>in</strong>duced by<br />
several key factors. First, despite the fact that the Dayton<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>g was concluded <strong>in</strong> November, the military was not<br />
given authority to mobilize reservists or beg<strong>in</strong> deployment<br />
of “enabl<strong>in</strong>g forces” to ensure a smooth deployment of the<br />
forces who would perform the mission until the last m<strong>in</strong>ute.<br />
Secondly, <strong>in</strong> establishment of the transfer of authority<br />
(TOA) date, the time required to deploy was apparently not<br />
considered. TOA was established as December 2, 1995, and<br />
we were not given permission to deploy until December 15.<br />
No s<strong>in</strong>gle deployment headquarters was established for the<br />
deployment. Possibly this was because 21st TAACOM is<br />
primarily a reserve organization, and authorization to<br />
activate personnel was received late.<br />
There were some self-<strong>in</strong>flicted wounds as well. TFE was<br />
not able to plan adequately because of simultaneous<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and deployment requirements. I remember one day<br />
at Grafenwoehr when the brigade staff was plann<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
real Bosnian mission—plann<strong>in</strong>g deployment, participat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong> a fire coord<strong>in</strong>ation exercise, plann<strong>in</strong>g the movement of<br />
units from Grafenwoehr to Hohenfels, plann<strong>in</strong>g the exercise<br />
mission at Hohenfels, and <strong>in</strong>stall<strong>in</strong>g a new communications<br />
system <strong>in</strong> all their vehicles. This was all <strong>in</strong> the same day,<br />
with a staff so sparsely manned that it had a difficult time<br />
plann<strong>in</strong>g a future operation while execut<strong>in</strong>g a current one.<br />
The result was considerable risk of mission success. Had<br />
the Bosnian factions not been cooperative, I believe it would<br />
have been very difficult for us to enforce compliance <strong>in</strong><br />
accordance with the timel<strong>in</strong>e established at Dayton. The<br />
other result was the immeasurable suffer<strong>in</strong>g by numerous<br />
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