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108 RISK MANAGEMENT AND VALUE CREATION IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS<br />

assets), 292 <strong>and</strong> somewhat larger for f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>stitutions (approximately<br />

10% of the failed bank’s assets) .293<br />

2. Indirect costs: However, the real driv<strong>in</strong>g factor for the costs of<br />

f<strong>in</strong>ancial distress is <strong>in</strong>direct costs, that is, the opportunity costs<br />

associated with f<strong>in</strong>ancial distress situations. They are much more<br />

likely to occur than an actual default <strong>and</strong> can be differentiated<br />

<strong>in</strong>to two groups:<br />

a. Indirect costs due to agency problems associated with f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

distress:<br />

■ The under<strong>in</strong>vestment problem (as described previously for<br />

“normal” levels of debt) can be exaggerated <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

distress situations <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g ways:<br />

– F<strong>in</strong>ancial distress may trigger debt covenants that place<br />

additional (that is, above normal) restrictions on management<br />

decision mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> hence might <strong>in</strong>duce the<br />

systematical pass<strong>in</strong>g up of positive NPV projects.<br />

– Due to the <strong>in</strong>terference of the bankruptcy court <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>and</strong> operat<strong>in</strong>g decisions, nonrout<strong>in</strong>e expenditures<br />

might not be approved, lead<strong>in</strong>g to under<strong>in</strong>vestment.<br />

294<br />

– The impossibility of rais<strong>in</strong>g external funds <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

distress situations may lead to capital ration<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>,<br />

hence, under<strong>in</strong>vestment. 295<br />

– The fact of liv<strong>in</strong>g on the edge of bankruptcy means<br />

that, consequently, the benefits of tak<strong>in</strong>g on positive<br />

NPV projects accrue to debt holders most prom<strong>in</strong>ently.<br />

Shareholders (<strong>and</strong> their managers), who then will not<br />

expect a normally expected return, will tend to<br />

under<strong>in</strong>vest.<br />

■ F<strong>in</strong>ancial distress may provide the <strong>in</strong>centive for management<br />

to behave more opportunistically (i.e., to <strong>in</strong>crease<br />

the firm’s level of risk) than usual <strong>in</strong> the presence of debt<br />

f<strong>in</strong>ance (asset substitution). 296<br />

292 See, for example, Weiss (1990).<br />

293 See James (1991), pp. 1228 <strong>and</strong> 1241. The mean of his sample is 9.96% <strong>and</strong> the<br />

median 9.51%.<br />

294 See Smith (1995), p. 20.<br />

295<br />

See Damodaran (1997), p. 452.<br />

296 Stulz (1996), p. 17, provides the supposed behavior of managers of nearly <strong>in</strong>solvent<br />

sav<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> loans <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> the United States <strong>in</strong> the 1980s <strong>and</strong> 1990s as an<br />

example.

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