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150 RISK MANAGEMENT AND VALUE CREATION IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS<br />

Note that many banks hold capital <strong>in</strong> excess 73 of the regulatory m<strong>in</strong>imum<br />

as an extra buffer 74 to avoid regulatory <strong>in</strong>tervention 75 <strong>in</strong> the form of<br />

“prompt corrective action” <strong>and</strong> the subsequent costs associated with <strong>in</strong>creased<br />

oversight <strong>and</strong> restricted bus<strong>in</strong>ess activities. 76<br />

Required Capital from an Economic Perspective After discuss<strong>in</strong>g the regulatory<br />

views on (equity) capital <strong>in</strong> some detail, we now turn to the economic<br />

view on capital (requirements) <strong>in</strong> banks that focuses on its buffer function<br />

aga<strong>in</strong>st future, unidentified losses. 77 We depart here from the traditional<br />

form of risk management of hold<strong>in</strong>g equity capital as an “all-purpose”<br />

cushion for absorb<strong>in</strong>g risk without the need to know the exact source for<br />

the unexpected losses. 78 We have already identified hedg<strong>in</strong>g as an alternative<br />

form of risk management—which is a very targeted means of limit<strong>in</strong>g<br />

risk, because the bank needs to specify exactly what k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>and</strong> which quantity<br />

of risk it is exposed to <strong>in</strong> order to determ<strong>in</strong>e the most suitable (f<strong>in</strong>ancial)<br />

risk-management <strong>in</strong>strument. However, once the firm has acquired the necessary<br />

capability of measur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> quantify<strong>in</strong>g its risks <strong>and</strong> decided to keep<br />

some risks on its books, it can use this knowledge to tailor the capital requirement<br />

to it—from a purely risk-based <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>sider’s perspective.<br />

Before we turn to the detailed determ<strong>in</strong>ation of the economically driven<br />

capital requirement <strong>in</strong> the “Ways to Determ<strong>in</strong>e Economic Capital for Various<br />

<strong>Risk</strong> Types <strong>in</strong> Banks (Bottom-Up)” section, we will discuss how the<br />

various bank stakeholders’ <strong>in</strong>terests can be aligned so that they can agree on<br />

a s<strong>in</strong>gle capital amount. We will then briefly discuss how the bank determ<strong>in</strong>es<br />

whether it has sufficient capital funds to support the risk<strong>in</strong>ess of its<br />

portfolio of assets.<br />

As we have already described above, the various stakeholders of a bank<br />

have very different views on how much capital a bank should hold. These<br />

different op<strong>in</strong>ions can be best summarized <strong>in</strong> Figure 5.2.<br />

Figure 5.2 depicts (<strong>in</strong> stylized form) the overall value distribution of a<br />

bank, whose shape is determ<strong>in</strong>ed by the risk<strong>in</strong>ess of the bank’s assets. As can<br />

73 Additionally, excess capital can be held as extra cushion for unexpected negative<br />

shocks (see Berger et al. [1995b], p. 418), for lucrative new bus<strong>in</strong>ess (i.e., unexpected<br />

profitable) opportunities, or for acquisitions.<br />

74 Failure to meet these capital requirements will not necessarily result <strong>in</strong> default, but<br />

will probably trigger regulatory <strong>in</strong>tervention aga<strong>in</strong>st the management of the group.<br />

75 See Berger et al. (1995b), p. 403.<br />

76 See Davis <strong>and</strong> Lee (1997), pp. 36–37.<br />

77 However, Schmittmann et al. (1996), pp. 651 <strong>and</strong> 653, argue that equity is not a<br />

cushion because all of the troubled banks <strong>in</strong> Germany over the past 50 years only<br />

tapped <strong>in</strong>to their equity resources to default at the same time.<br />

78 See Merton (1995a), p. 464.

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