Import risk analysis: Llamas (Lama glama) and alpacas (Vicugna ...

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Since salmonellosis in camelids is rarely reported, much of the information given below is extrapolated from other species, particularly cattle, in which enteric salmonellosis caused by host adapted serovars is a very common form of the disease. In enteric salmonellosis transmission is mainly by the oral route and factors such as infecting dose, the particular strain and serovar, and various stress factors influence the outcome of infection (Fenwick & Collett 2004). The incubation period in camelids is not known, but in cattle it is as little as 15 minutes in newborn calves (Radostits et al 2007). After oral infection, salmonellae colonise the distal ileum. Initial infection may be followed by bacteraemia and dissemination to several organs. In the case of pregnant animals, abortion may occur. Animals that recover from Salmonella infections may become carriers for life, shedding organisms sporadically in their faeces. Excreted organisms contaminate the environment and become a source of infection (Radostits et al 2007). Carriers of infections can be detected by culturing faeces but, because excretion is intermittent, repeated sampling and culture may be necessary. Serology may be useful but is best applied on a herd basis (Davies 2008; Veling et al 2002). No practical serological method exists for detecting individual carrier animals (Hansen et al 2006). 29.1.5. Hazard identification conclusion Salmonellosis is very rarely reported in camels. However, assuming that they could, like other animals, become carriers of exotic Salmonella serovars such as S. Dublin or S. Typhimurium DT104 that could be harmful to animal industries or to humans, salmonellae are considered to be potential hazards in the commodity. 29.2. RISK ASSESSMENT 29.2.1. Entry assessment Salmonella spp. have a world-wide distribution and the range of serovars varies from one country to the next. Assuming that subclinical carriers can occur, the likelihood that imported camelids could introduce exotic Salmonella serovars is assessed to be nonnegligible. 29.2.2. Exposure assessment Imported camelids will be introduced onto premises where New Zealand camelids and other animals are present. Assuming that camelids that are enteric carriers of salmonellae will excrete organisms in their faeces as other carrier animals do, the likelihood of exposure and infection of indigenous animals is assessed to be non-negligible. 29.2.3. Consequence assessment Introduction of infected animals would be likely to result in spread of the organisms throughout the country due to movement of animals and people. The potential for spread is illustrated by the spread of S. Brandenberg in sheep and humans (Clark et al 2004; Clarke & Tomlinson 2004). Another example was the spread of S. Typhimurium DT160 following its first detection in sparrows and humans (Alley et al 2002). It spread rapidly to become the most widely isolated Salmonella spp. as can be seen in the data reported in the ESR database (ESR 2009). Introduction of new serovars may result in production losses in 108 ● Import risk analysis: Llamas and alpacas from specified countries MAF Biosecurity New Zealand
animals and sporadic cases of salmonellosis in humans. Wild and feral animals and birds may also be susceptible to infection.The consequences of introduction are therefore considered to be non-negligible. 29.2.4. Risk estimation Since entry, exposure and consequence assessments are all non-negligible, the risk is assessed as non-negligible and exotic salmonellae are classified as hazards in the commodity. Therefore, risk management measures may be justified. 29.3. RISK MANAGEMENT 29.3.1. Options The following points were considered when drafting options for the effective management of exotic salmonellae in the commodity: � Salmonellae are very rarely reported in camelids, and there is no evidence of host adapted serovars in camelids. � When considering imports of animals that may be long term carriers, quarantine without other supporting measures is not useful to prevent the introduction of exotic salmonellae. � Carriers of infections can be detected by culturing faeces but, because excretion is intermittent, repeated sampling and culture may be necessary. � There are no suitable vaccines for use in camelids. � Treatment is not a useful option since resistance of salmonellae to antibiotics is widespread. � Many serovars of salmonellae are present in New Zealand, including most of the common and significant serovars. � There are large numbers of horses, cats and dogs imported into New Zealand without safeguards for salmonellae. � About 4 million people enter New Zealand annually without any safeguards being applied for salmonellae. Up to 11 % are likely to be carrying Salmonellae. Direct person-to-person spread is estimated to be around 5 % of human cases in New Zealand (MacDiarmid 2010). � There are no recommendations in the Code relating to Salmonella serovars for species other than poultry. The following options measures could be considered in order to effectively manage the risks. 1. Camelids could be imported without restrictions. NB. This measure recognises that salmonellae are very rarely reported in camelids and assumes that importation of exotic salmonellae by camelids is an insignificant pathway of introduction when compared to other pathways. This option would be consistent with the fact that there are large numbers of horses, cats and dogs imported into New Zealand without safeguards. MAF Biosecurity New Zealand Import risk analysis: Llamas and alpacas from specified countries ● 109
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Import risk analysis: Llamas (Lama
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MAF Biosecurity New Zealand Pastora
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CONTENTS Executive Summary 1 1. Int
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Acronyms CDC United States Centers
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Executive Summary This risk analysi
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1. Introduction The importation of
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Figure 1. The risk analysis process
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Following public consultation on th
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Disease agent Foot and mouth diseas
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Disease agent PROTOZOA Eimeria alpa
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Bacteria, rickettsias and spirochae
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McKenna PB (2009). An updated check
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6. African horse sickness virus 6.1
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7. Bluetongue virus 7.1. HAZARD IDE
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8. Borna virus 8.1. HAZARD IDENTIFI
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8.2.2. Risk estimation Since entry
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It has been suggested that as many
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Therefore, since the the consequenc
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Givens MD, Heath AM, Brock KV, Brod
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10. Bovine herpesvirus type 1 10.1.
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10.2.2. Exposure assessment Importe
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Bartha A, Haidu G, Aldassy P, Paczo
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11. Epizootic haemorrhagic disease
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12. Eastern equine encephalitis vir
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13. Equine herpesvirus type 1 13.1.
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13.2.2. Exposure assessment Assumin
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Davison AJ, Erberle R, Hayward GS,
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1993). According to Fowler (1992),
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Veterinary Authorities should requi
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15. Louping-ill virus 15.1. HAZARD
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16. Rabies virus 16.1. HAZARD IDENT
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� Rabies is a serious zoonotic di
Page 65 and 66: 17. Vesicular stomatitis virus 17.1
Page 67 and 68: incubation period of the disease. T
Page 69 and 70: quarantined with protection from in
Page 71 and 72: Pharo HJ (1999). Vesicular stomatit
Page 73 and 74: 18.1.5. Hazard identification concl
Page 75 and 76: necessarily be competent vectors, a
Page 77 and 78: 20. Bacillus anthracis 20.1. HAZARD
Page 79 and 80: 20.3. RISK MANAGEMENT 20.3.1. Optio
Page 81 and 82: 21. Brucella spp. 21.1. HAZARD IDEN
Page 83 and 84: 21.2.4. Risk estimation Since entry
Page 85 and 86: Gilsdorf MJ, Thoen CO, Temple RM, G
Page 87 and 88: References References marked * were
Page 89 and 90: Serological tests include the compl
Page 91 and 92: with negative results using the com
Page 93 and 94: 24. Coxiella burnetii 24.1. HAZARD
Page 95 and 96: � Although quarantine is not suit
Page 97 and 98: 25. Leptospira serovars 25.1. HAZAR
Page 99 and 100: immune response is a low titre that
Page 101 and 102: Retention of this empty Chapter, wi
Page 103 and 104: 26. Mycobacterium bovis 26.1. HAZAR
Page 105 and 106: 26.3. RISK MANAGEMENT 26.3.1. Optio
Page 109 and 110: without any measures for detecting
Page 113 and 114: Animals become septicaemic a few ho
Page 115: 29. Salmonella spp. 29.1. HAZARD ID
Page 119 and 120: Hansen KR, Nielsen LR, Lind P (2006
Page 121 and 122: Camelidae diseases, or as transmitt
Page 123 and 124: 32. Trypanosoma spp. 32.1. HAZARD I
Page 125 and 126: T. evansi and T. vivax occur in Sou
Page 127 and 128: 5. Animals to be imported could be
Page 129 and 130: (Kittelberger et al 2002) and is th
Page 131 and 132: � The role of an IHS is to specif
Page 133 and 134: 34. Internal parasites 34.1. HAZARD
Page 135 and 136: 34.1.4.2. Trematodes The following
Page 137 and 138: 34.2.4. Risk estimation Since entry
Page 139 and 140: 35. Mites, lice and fleas 35.1. HAZ
Page 141 and 142: 35.2. RISK ASSESSMENT 35.2.1. Entry
Page 143 and 144: N.B. This measure reflects the curr
Page 145 and 146: Hard ticks (Ixodidae) have a lifecy
Page 147 and 148: 1. Camelids could be treated with p
Page 149 and 150: the Eastern Cape and North-West Pro
Page 151 and 152: The larvae reach maturity about 4-8
Page 153 and 154: exploration, debriding and flushing
Page 155 and 156: a. all animals have been re-examine
Page 157 and 158: 38. Weeds and seeds 38.1. HAZARD ID
Page 159 and 160: edding materials include wood shavi
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