Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Chapter 6. The South Asian Standoff141have speculated.” (P. Musharraf, In the Line of Fire. A Memoir [London:2006], P. 286).32 Ibid., P. 285.33 For details of Pakistan’s nuclear materials and technology smuggling abroad,see: V.E. Novikov, “<strong>Nuclear</strong> Technology Leaks out of Pakistan – Confirmationof Crisis in the International <strong>Nuclear</strong> Weapons Nonproliferation Regime,”<strong>Nuclear</strong> Control 10, no. 2(72) (2004): PP. 95-103; <strong>Nuclear</strong> Black Markets:Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks. A Net Assessment,ed. M. Fitzpatrick (London: 2007).34 Statement by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Dawn, Sept. 5, 1999.35 D. Albright, “India’s and Pakistan’s Fissile Material and <strong>Nuclear</strong> WeaponsInventories, End of 1999” (Washington: 1999) PP. 1-2; Cirincione et al.,Deadly Arsenals, P. 207.36 A.A. Pikayev, “Nonstrategic <strong>Nuclear</strong> Weapons,” in <strong>Nuclear</strong> Proliferation:New Technology, Weapons and Treaties, ed. A.G. Arbatov and V.Z.Dvorkin (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2009), P.133; The News,Oct. 2, 2001.37 T. Iqbal, “Pakistan Tests Upgraded Shaheen II,” Pakistan Defence, Feb.22, 2007.38 For more details about the nuclear cooperation of North Korea and Iran, see:V.V. Yevseyev and V.I. Sazhin, “The <strong>Nuclear</strong> Missile Shields of Two ‘RogueStates.’ The DPRK and Iran Unite Their Resources to Create an AdvancedMissile Potential,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, Feb. 13, 2009.39 “AQ Khan Network Still Alive: US Think Tank,” Times of India, Sept. 8,2006.40 <strong>Nuclear</strong> Black Markets, PP. 43-64.41 Although he is often cited as being the main problem. For reference, seethe statements of P. Musharraf and George Tenet, the former directorof the CIA: “It was becoming clear that AQ was not ‘part of the problem’but ‘the problem’ itself.” (Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, P. 288); Khanis “at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden.” (“AQ Khan Network StillAlive,” Times of India, Sept. 8, 2006).42 On the whole, there were 1,080 official cases of illegal fissile materialstorage or transport from 1993 through 2006. In 67 percent of the cases,the material that was stolen or unaccounted for was never seen again(IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database [ITDB] [Vienna: International AtomicEnergy Agency, 2006]. PP. 3-5).43 Dawn, Sept. 15, 2004.44 Z. Ali, Pakistan’s <strong>Nuclear</strong> Assets and Threats of Terrorism: How Grave isthe Danger? (Washington: 2007), PP. 8-9.