Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Chapter 18. The Dialectics of <strong>Nuclear</strong> Disarmament and Nonproliferation355This question can only be answered in the form of a hypothesis.Skeptics and opponents of nuclear disarmament in Washington,Moscow, and a number of other major capitals categoricallydeny such an interrelation. In fact, they assert that cuts in nuclearweapons to levels of a few hundred (or even a few dozen) warheadsin Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union/Russia, and the UnitedStates would only reinforce the incentive for further proliferation,making it relatively easier for the “threshold nations” to achievethe levels of nuclear weapons held by the Big Five countries.An additional argument against nuclear disarmament is centeredon the fact that the parties to the Treaty have done very little so fartoward meeting their obligations under the second part of ArticleVI (in which the parties undertake to pursue and ultimately signa treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effectiveinternational control). 4Advocates of the reduction and limitation of nuclear weaponshave asserted to the contrary that this scenario would have hada tangible effect on nuclear nonproliferation. In particular, this argumenthas been raised at each and every NPT Review Conferenceby the majority of non-nuclear member nations, who have accusedthe nuclear powers of failing to meet their obligations under ArticleVI of the NPT.As usual, real life is far more complicated than linear yes-no logic,and is certainly more complicated than the political stances thatgovernments assume at international forums.Doubtless, the factors that would impel a nation to acquirenuclear weapons are more varied and contradictory than simplywanting to follow the example of the nuclear states. The mainmotivations for the leadership of any nation to decide to developnuclear weapons relate to external security issues, prestige in theworld arena, domestic popularity, or eliciting concessions fromother countries in exchange for renouncing or limiting their nuclearactivity. The NPT does not address any of these objectivesdirectly or effectively (for example, in the sense of offering nationsmore attractive rewards in these areas in exchange for their nonacquisitionof nuclear weapons), nor does it present any potentialserious economic or political price to pay by those nations thatdo not cooperate. Nor do agreements between the great powerson nuclear disarmament necessarily have a direct impact on theabove-mentioned incentives.