Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

60<strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Reset</strong>: Arms Reduction and Nonproliferationments will prompt Great Britain to reconsider these plans.While preserving the option of delivering limited nuclear strikesagainst “rogue states,” Great Britain has not overemphasized its relianceon nuclear weapons, adhering instead to the strategy of “minimalnuclear deterrence.” For example, London has officially declaredthat its nuclear forces are on low alert, and that they would needadditional time to prepare for use upon receiving the appropriateorders from the top command. However, Great Britain has providedno technical explanations as to what exactly this involves.The United Kingdom has declared its entire fissile material stockpile,and has also placed fissile materials that are no longer neededfor military purposes under international IAEA safeguards. In addition,it has opened its enrichment and processing facilities to internationalIAEA inspections and begun to put together a historical ledgerof all fissile materials it had produced in the past. It is also conductingan experience-building program in nuclear weapons reductionand destruction checks. For example, in 2004, the third sessionof the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 NPT Review Conferenceagreed to investigate whether or not the technology control regimecould also be used for decommissioned weapons.The People’s Republic of China conducted its first nuclear testin 1964. At the moment, China is the only permanent UN SecurityCouncil member and the only one of five Parties to the Treatyon the Nonproliferation of <strong>Nuclear</strong> Weapons legally recognized asnuclear powers that discloses no official armed forces data, leavingits nuclear forces completely under wraps.Officially, this secrecy is justified as follows: since China has a numericallyinferior nuclear force that cannot compare in technicalcapability to those of the other members of the “nuclear five,” itneeds to preserve SNF secrecy in order to maintain its deterrencepotential. At the same time, China is the only great power to haveofficially endorsed the no-first-strike policy; moreover, it has doneso without any reservations. This promise has been accompanied bya few vague unofficial explanations (which are probably sanctionedby the authorities) to the effect that in time of peace, China keeps itsnuclear warheads separate from its missiles. These unofficial sourcesfurther explain that in the case of a nuclear attack, these warheadswould be loaded into delivery vehicles, and a retaliatory strike wouldbe delivered against the aggressor within two weeks. If this really isthe case, it may be explained by the fact that China lacks the technol-