Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Chapter 17. Nonproliferation Institutions3418 UN Document S/RES/1887 (2009). Sept. 24, 2009.9 The NPT established the international legal standard of applying IAEAsafeguards “to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclearactivities” within the territory of non-nuclear-weapon NPT memberstates, under their jurisdiction, or carried out under their control anywhere.IAEA safeguards are intended to monitor a nation’s compliancewith its obligation not to divert nuclear materials to weapons (ArticleIII). The IAEA is to provide timely warning of diversion to enable the internationalcommunity to intervene.10 Among the nuclear activities that Iran failed to declare on a timely basiswas the conversion of natural uranium into uranium hexafluoride (UF 6)for subsequent enrichment. The NPT does not prohibit its non-nuclearweaponmember states (NNWS) from having such facilities, but theymust be reported to the IAEA in a timely manner and placed under itssafeguards. In failing to meet this requirement, the Iranian authoritieshad infringed the international NPT regime. It was this act in particularthat raised doubts in the international community about the exclusivelypeaceful nature of the INP.11 Khan admitted in 2004 to having transferred “sensitive” nuclear technologyand information to Iran. A subsequent investigation into his networkfound that a number of European companies had violated the rules of nationaland international nuclear export control regimes when they providedassistance to Iran. Although this network had been broken, manyof Khan’s accomplices escaped punishment. Gaps still exist in the systemof international nuclear export controls.12 IAEA Document GOV/2006/15. The APSA is an important elementof the IAEA safeguards system that provides IAEA inspectors with unrestrictedaccess to nuclear facilities in a state to investigate questions andinconsistencies arising from information analysis. Although Iran signedthe APSA and applied it on a “provisional” basis from December 2003, itstopped complying with its provisions in 2005.13 IAEA Document GOV/2006/14.14 The agreed position of the members of the UNSC on the INP was setforth in the Statement of the UNSC President of March 29, 2006 (seeUN Document S/PRST/2006 /15), and in UNSCR 1696 of July 31, 2006(UN document S/RES /1696/2006), which underscored the fact thatthe IAEA had been unable to conclude with certainty that Iran did nothave any non-declared nuclear materials, noting that the Agency hadbeen unable to make any progress in its efforts to guarantee the absenceof undeclared nuclear materials or activities ies in Iran, and expressing con-cern about the proliferation risk that the Iranian nuclear program posed.Resolution 1696 has been adopted under Article 40 of the UN Charter,which deals with provisional measures that the Security Council is author-