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Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

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Chapter 16. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> Fuel Cycle309it would <strong>on</strong>ly be for the distant future. Over the next few decades,nuclear power generati<strong>on</strong> will c<strong>on</strong>tinue to expand based exclusively<strong>on</strong> the use of light water reactors and existing fuel cycle technologies.Thus, a soluti<strong>on</strong> to the n<strong>on</strong>proliferati<strong>on</strong> problems caused bythe potential increase in the number of nati<strong>on</strong>s using nuclear powershould be sought through the implementati<strong>on</strong> of new instituti<strong>on</strong>al,ec<strong>on</strong>omic, and political barriers. All of these measures, while notcreating obstacles to the development and use of nuclear power bynewcomer countries, would induce them to voluntarily renounceacquisiti<strong>on</strong> of NFC technologies.Countries are usually motivated to pursue NFC technology forthe following reas<strong>on</strong>s:• to improve nati<strong>on</strong>al security and enhance nati<strong>on</strong>al prestigeby gaining a nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s potential;• to ensure nati<strong>on</strong>al energy independence and security;• to gain ec<strong>on</strong>omic benefit.Brazil and Iran, for example, could be c<strong>on</strong>sidered to have been developingNFC technology primarily for the first and sec<strong>on</strong>d of thesereas<strong>on</strong>s. At the same time, both motives could apply in <strong>on</strong>e combinati<strong>on</strong>or another, or the sec<strong>on</strong>d could officially be used to c<strong>on</strong>cealthe first.The argument of ec<strong>on</strong>omic benefit as justificati<strong>on</strong> usually appearsrather dubious. The cost of nuclear fuel (including the price of uraniumand cost of uranium enrichment) comprises <strong>on</strong>ly a small fracti<strong>on</strong>of the costs of the electricity produced by a reactor. Even a tenfoldincrease in the price of natural uranium (from 30 to 300 dollarsper kilogram) would result in no more than a 20 percent increasein the cost per kilowatt hour. 10 Similarly, a doubling of the priceper SWU would increase the cost of a single kilowatt hour by <strong>on</strong>lya few percent. 11 Thus, the argument in favor of acquiring enrichmenttechnology for the ec<strong>on</strong>omic benefit remains unc<strong>on</strong>vincing.Whether or not such enrichment plants are being developed to exporttheir products (where the ec<strong>on</strong>omic benefits would be tiedto global market c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s) is a different questi<strong>on</strong>.On the other hand, the energy security argument for acquiringNFC technology is very c<strong>on</strong>vincing, requiring that global market capabilitiesbe studied to guarantee that the entire range of civil NFCproducts and services be reliably provided, above all those relatingto deliveries of uranium and the provisi<strong>on</strong> of enrichment services.Without such guarantees, no nati<strong>on</strong> (particularly if it is c<strong>on</strong>sidered

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