Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Chapter 1. Deterrence and Strategic Stability35range missiles). Currently, Britain has four strategic submarinesarmed with U.S.-made Trident II missiles. 4 The British governmentreports having slashed the number of their warheads to 160, whichis just over a quarter of their potential capability. France has alsopreserved a small aviation component in addition to its four submarines.It remains the only nuclear power to have nuclear deliveryvehicles on an aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle.This means that with the passing of the Cold War, Europe’s nuclear-weaponpowers have almost completely abandoned the nuclearcapabilities that could conceivably be used in a European militaryconflict. This, in turn, has even further diminished their role in reinforcingU.S. nuclear capabilities in Europe.Great Britain is currently debating the possibility of reducing itsfuture strategic submarine fleet to three submarines, and France willalso find it difficult to avoid a new round of unilateral nuclear cutsshould there be another wave of such disarmament in the UnitedStates and Russia.Unlike Britain or France, China, so far as is known, has never undertakenunilateral disarmament measures. However, with the passingof the Cold War, its efforts to modernize its nuclear forces havefocused on qualitative improvement rather than on increasing numbers,although in light of its strong gains in economic power, militarybudgets, and military and technological advances, China’s arsenalcould potentially grow by hundreds of warheads, if the correspondingpolitical decision were made.During the Cold War, the Soviet Union viewed tactical nuclearweapons (TNWs) as complementary to the strategic nuclear forcesof the United States, which deployed tactical nuclear weapons at itsforward bases in Europe and Asia and placed them aboard its shipsand submarines. Nevertheless, since TNWs were primarily plannedto be used in scenarios involving escalating conventional war in theateroperations, the United States and the Soviet Union failed to everagree on the role they played in strategic stability. From the Sovietstandpoint, they were a destabilizing means for a first strike bythe United States. From the NATO perspective, they representeda counterweight to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact’s superiority in generalpurpose forces (GPF).The parties found themselves on opposite sides of this equation afterthe end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the WarsawPact had dissolved and Russia was severely weakened by a protracted