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Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

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Chapter 18. The Dialectics of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> Disarmament and N<strong>on</strong>proliferati<strong>on</strong>357against Iran in the 1980s using chemical weap<strong>on</strong>s and tactical missiles.Once the war ended, however, fears of the potential use of forceby the United States (especially up<strong>on</strong> the Republican administrati<strong>on</strong>’saccessi<strong>on</strong> to power in 2000) and by Israel (an undeclarednuclear power) took center stage, in additi<strong>on</strong> to ambiti<strong>on</strong>s for a regi<strong>on</strong>aland global status and overall prestige. The latter were c<strong>on</strong>nectedwith the creati<strong>on</strong> of nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s in neighboring Indiaand Pakistan and Tehran’s ever more insistent asserti<strong>on</strong> that it hadbecome the leader of the Islamic world following the defeat of theTaliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and in lightof the instability of the regimes in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.In this case, too, it would appear at first glance that the nucleardisarmament efforts pursued by the United States, Russia, and othergreat powers under Article VI of the NPT could hardly have beenexpected to have any influence over the suspicious aspects of theIranian nuclear program.Dialectical InterdependenceDeeper analysis, however, makes the c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> unavoidable thatthere really has been and c<strong>on</strong>tinues to be a positive link betweendisarmament and n<strong>on</strong>proliferati<strong>on</strong> (although not a direct link, but<strong>on</strong>e much more intricate and subtle).In the first place, this would derive from the general atmosphereof perceived internati<strong>on</strong>al security under which a nati<strong>on</strong> defines itsattitude toward nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s, no matter what the specific or individualfactors that might dictate such an attitude at any given time.It could hardly be c<strong>on</strong>sidered random coincidence that serious nucleardisarmament negotiati<strong>on</strong>s and real nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s reducti<strong>on</strong>(INF, START I, START II, the New START framework, the ABMTreaty, the CTBT, and the unilateral tactical nuclear forces cutbacksundertaken by the United States and the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong>/Russia)have been paralleled by some 40 additi<strong>on</strong>al members that havejoined the NPT, including two nuclear powers (China and France).The Treaty was indefinitely extended in 1995, and in 1997 the Additi<strong>on</strong>alProtocol was developed. Four nati<strong>on</strong>s (Argentina, Brazil, Iraq,and South Africa) aband<strong>on</strong>ed military nuclear programs and nuclearweap<strong>on</strong>s or had them eliminated by force from outside, while threeother nati<strong>on</strong>s (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) that had been left

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