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Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

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Chapter 11. The Threat of Accidental <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> Exchange229not require any additi<strong>on</strong>al m<strong>on</strong>ey to be spent <strong>on</strong> maintaining aining the deployedSLBMs in operati<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>. To reinstall the warheads<strong>on</strong> each SLBM would take at least three hours. C<strong>on</strong>sequently, itwould take between 48 and 72 hours to install the warheads <strong>on</strong> allof the SLBMs to be deployed <strong>on</strong> each submarine, depending up<strong>on</strong>the number of launch tubes <strong>on</strong> the various classes of SLBM submarine.It would take substantially more time if the warheads have been removedfrom the base to centralized storage.The method of reducing combat launch readiness by removingthe SLBMs from a submarine’s launch tubes and placing them intostorage would be the most time-c<strong>on</strong>suming in terms of restoringlaunch readiness. Although under current U.S. practice, a porti<strong>on</strong>of a submarine’s s SLBMs is stored in the loading tubes, which permitsa fairly rapid reload of all of its launch tubes (48 to 96 hoursfor an Ohio class submarine), the technology for loading the SLBMsinto loading tubes has remained quite labor and time intensive, andthe time required to bring a single strategic submarine to launchreadiness could be as l<strong>on</strong>g as 30 days, assuming that there are enoughloading tubes available.At the same time, all of the measures described above would alsoallow complete m<strong>on</strong>itoring over the technical c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of nuclearsafety <strong>on</strong> patrol and would allow remote electrical checks to be made;in additi<strong>on</strong>, they could be c<strong>on</strong>ducted in parallel with any scheduledrepair or maintenance work. The missiles could not be launched untilrestored to their previous c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>, since in deactivated mode theirlaunch sequence c<strong>on</strong>trols are automatically blocked.The air comp<strong>on</strong>ent of the U.S. and Russian nuclear triads hasnot usually been associated with the launch-<strong>on</strong>-warning c<strong>on</strong>cept.Unlike ICBMs in fixed or mobile launchers or SLBM submarinesat sea <strong>on</strong> patrol, bombers would not survive a nuclear strike <strong>on</strong> theirbases and would be able to escape destructi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly if they succeededin making a quick takeoff. Unlike missiles, however, aircraft can berecalled ed to base in case of a false alarm. In a crisis situati<strong>on</strong>, bomberscould be placed <strong>on</strong> 15-minute alert (with the aircraft fueled andparked at the end of the runway, weap<strong>on</strong>s secured in bays and <strong>on</strong> py-l<strong>on</strong>s, and the flight crews in their cockpits). Some of the aircraftcould be designated for flight patrol, where they could remain aloftfor prol<strong>on</strong>ged periods (up to 76 hours for the B-52 heavy bomber).Nevertheless, <strong>on</strong>ce the reducti<strong>on</strong> in missile launch readinesshas reached a certain level, the aviati<strong>on</strong> comp<strong>on</strong>ent would have

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