Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

512<strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Reset</strong>: Arms Reduction and Nonproliferationmament, was used to full measure during the preparation of the NewSTART, and will remain relevant in the future.The prolonged break in strategic dialogue between Russia andthe United States ended with the negotiation and signature of the NewStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the two nuclear superpowersin Prague in April 2010. The New START limits mainlythe numbers of warheads deployed on delivery vehicles, the numbersof deployed delivery vehicles, and the total number of deployed andnon-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers. Thereare no restrictions on the structure or makeup of the nuclear triad,while the rules for counting strategic weapons, inspection systems,and notifications have been simplified.Compared to the actual levels of SNFs, the limits set on warheadsunder the New START primarily reflect changes to the procedure forcounting warheads on strategic delivery vehicles, thereby “legalizing”the existing and forecast numbers of strategic weapons. Nevertheless,this number of nuclear warheads is only a fifth of the number at the endof the Cold War, and a third of the limits under START I.To resolve existing contradictions over BMD and other mattersover coming decades appears no less important than to continue reductionsof the SNFs. The Obama administration’s decision in 2009to cancel the deployment of the strategic BMD system in the CzechRepublic and Poland has opened the door to compromise.However, the approach to cooperation in the BMD area to whichthe leaders of Russia and the United States both have agreed has notbeen pursued actively enough, and has thus far amounted to littlemore than joint assessment of probable missile threats. At the sametime, however, there is a significant potential for real cooperation betweenthe two powers, above all in the sphere of information systemintegration. The proposed Joint Center for the Exchange of Datafrom Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches(creation of which was approved 12 years ago) should be reactivatedwithout delay, and the theater missile defense computer trainingexercises with the participation of Russia, the United States, andNATO should be resumed and eventually expanded to military testranges and beyond the theater of operations format. It would then bepossible to begin the joint development and deployment of a theatermissile defense system, followed by a global strategic missile defensesystem that would encompass the allies of the two powers, China,and other responsible states.