Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

270<strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Reset</strong>: Arms Reduction and Nonproliferationbilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State,to any of that State’s activities in the field of atomic energy.”The primary safeguard principles and methods are summarizedin some detail in Article III. They include various types of monitoringand inspection mechanisms, all the way to granting internationalinspectors access within the borders of a nation at any time to anysite as necessary for meeting the requirements of the safeguards.Moreover, if a case of violation of the safeguards agreement has beendiscovered, the Board of Governors may require the violating countryto immediately correct the situation; otherwise, it shall reportto the Security Council and the General Assembly for them to takethe appropriate measures, including those stipulated in Article VIIof the United Nations Charter. This last provision was includedin the Charter at the suggestion of the Soviet Union.In practice, safeguards under the IAEA Statute began to be appliedprimarily on the basis of bilateral and multilateral agreementsbetween the Agency and nations supplying or receiving nuclearmaterials, equipment, or technology under the principles outlinedin document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 of 1965 through 1968. This safeguardsdocument provided procedures for implementing controlsover certain nuclear facilities, but not for nuclear activity as a whole.It is currently applied in nations that have not joined the NPT, butits main advantage rests in the fact that these controls will operatein perpetuity, unlike the NPT safeguards, which come to an endupon a nation’s withdrawal from the Treaty, as was the case withNorth Korea.Still, the NPT did establish the international legal standard of mandatingthe extension of IAEA safeguards to “all source or special fissionablematerial in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory,under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, forthe exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not divertedto nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Followingthe enactment of the Treaty, a special committee of the IAEA Boardof Governors developed a model comprehensive safeguards agreementfor non-nuclear member states of the NPT. 8The comprehensive safeguards system under the model safeguardsagreement and in practice is based on the following primary principlesand conditions:• the intent of the safeguards is to prevent diversion of nuclearmaterials from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufac-