Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Chapter 10. Non-Strategic <strong>Nuclear</strong> Weapons215are removed from their delivery vehicles and stockpiled at navy orair force bases or at centralized storage facilities within Russia andthe United States.In spite of some U.S. ideas to the contrary, it would not be possibleto combine the reduction and elimination of TNWs with reductionsof SNFs, inasmuch as TNWs are delivered by such dual-use vehiclesas aircraft, short-range missiles, surface ship or submarine weapons,and artillery. In essence, the limitation, reduction, or eliminationof TNWs involves the removal of nuclear explosive charges fromdual-use missiles, projectiles, and torpedoes, or from the weaponssystems aboard multi-purpose aircraft, ships, and submarines. Thus,as noted above, the reduction of TNWs, unlike SNFs, can never beachieved or controlled through the elimination of delivery vehicles.For this same reason, it will be incredibly difficult to agree on reducingTNWs to some level and to control such reductions. After all,the two sides would have to agree to inspections not of deployed (andnon-deployed) missile launchers and delivery vehicles, but of containersof stockpiled bombs and warheads in storages. This wouldbe a much more complicated task, especially since tactical nuclearmunitions are often stored alongside their vehicles, with warheadand bombs removed from missiles or bombers under the STARTTreaty and with munitions slated for recycling. Furthermore, thereare dozens of such warehouses and many thousands of warheads.If a greater portion of (dual-use) delivery vehicles is retained,the elimination of TNW charges would be primarily a symbolic (notto mention complex and expensive) measure, if the exact numberof remaining weapons cannot be verified, and it cannot be guaranteedthat these types of nuclear munitions are no longer being producedor stockpiled as replacements for eliminated warheads that could bequickly put into service. For the same reason, the measure of destroyingthe casings of nuclear explosive charges (as called for under the INFTreaty), would not be very effective. Since intermediate- and shortrangemissiles have been fully eliminated, there would be no placeto which to return the headers of the two classes of missiles to service,but the situation with TNWs is totally different. Verification of suchweapons at centralized storage facilities or the nuclear warhead manufacturer’sfactory warehouse (the final assembly shop in particular)assumes an unprecedented degree of openness in the most sensitiveareas of military and technical activity, while the context of the NewSTART Treaty implies less transparency, not more.