Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Chapter 7. Missile Technology153presented above serve as only partial evidence that countries raiseclaims about MTCR compliance quite frequently, but face seriousdifficulties in having them considered objectively.The case of Ukraine, where missile equipment was illegallytransferred by a group of people rather than by a state, presentsa unique situation. If an international criminal group could obtainsuch equipment with the intent to sell, then that would actuallyconfirm the validity of the fear that a terrorist group could acquiremissiles to carry out terrorist acts. Considering the potential threatto international security that this would represent, far deeper andmore effective controls are needed to cover every possible meansof missile proliferation.This unsatisfactory missile proliferation situation was one of the factorsthat compelled the MTCR membership to offer an initiativein the form of a document titled the International Code of ConductAgainst Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC), which was adoptedin November 2002 in the Hague and signed by 93 nations; thus far,the ICOC has been joined by over 120 nations.Unlike the MTCR, the ICOC (hailed as a step forward in developingthe MTCR Guidelines) is a political document. It proclaimedthe need to prevent and deter missile proliferation and the importanceof strengthening disarmament and nonproliferation regimes,and called for transparency in national missile programs. One importantprovision of the ICOC was the appeal for cuts in the nationalstockpiles of such missiles in the interest of global and regionalpeace and security, a more radical step than merely recommendingthe limitation of missile capabilities and exports. 13Particularly relevant was the decision to create an appropriatemechanism for the voluntary resolution of disputes related to nationaldeclarations; the lack of such a mechanism (which continuesto the present day) was mentioned above as one the major shortcomingsof the MTCR.The ICOC provides for an exchange of advance notificationsof launches and test flights of ballistic missiles and space missile carriers.It appears exceptionally important that the ICOC emphasizethe connection between space research programs and military ballisticmissile development.Nevertheless, Russia’s proposal to make the ICOC legally bindingdid not win support (nor did U.S. proposals to provide the MTCRwith a number of supranational functions, which Russia opposed).