Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Chapter 20. <strong>Nuclear</strong> Testing399in the Treaty. This will be the first time in the history of multilateralarms control agreements that a global verification system has beenestablished, with operations entrusted to an international Treaty organization.It became possible to achieve agreement on the creationof such a verification mechanism only because of the radical changesin the global situation that followed the Cold War, as well as throughthe necessary political will exercised on the part of all of the countriesthat participated in the development of the CTBT.As noted previously, integral to the CTBT verification mechanismare the International Monitoring System (IMS) linking 321 seismic,radionuclide, infrasound, and hydroacoustic monitoring stations; 16certified laboratories that may be used if necessary to perform indepthanalysis of radionuclide samples collected at radionuclide stations;an International Data Center (IDC) to collect, process, archive,and present data obtained from IMS sites to Treaty participants; a politicaland diplomatic mechanism for consulting on and clarifying suspicionsof potential CTBT violations; confidence-building measuresthat include data exchange on large-scale conventional explosivedetonations (meaning primarily industrial detonations, in particularin the mining industry); and on-site inspection of suspicious eventswith no right of refusal.The Treaty stipulates that its verification mechanism must beready for operation by the time the CTBT enters into force.After the CTBT was opened for signature on September 24,1996, the states that had signed the Treaty met in New YorkCity and on November 19, 1996, adopted the document that establishedthe Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization(PC CTBTO), which stated that the main goal of the Commission(to operate until the Treaty enters into force) was to establish andprovisionally implement a verification mechanism. The PreparatoryCommission of the CTBTO and its Provisional Technical Secretariat(PTS) formally began functioning in March 1997.In order to evaluate the difficulty, scope, and uniqueness of the taskthat the Commission and the PTS have faced in establishing a verificationmechanism, and to objectively evaluate the results achievedin this area up to the present time, the main components of the verificationmechanism and their interactions under the CTBT must beexamined in more detail.The structure and functioning of the IMS are considered below.The seismic component of the IMS is primarily intended for de-