Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Chapter 23. Space Weapons and the Problems461control components, which naturally would be accomplished throughthe use of the full complex of ABM countermeasures and by launchingthe greatest possible number of missiles. This was a function bothof the total number of such missiles available in combat readinessand the survivability of their launchers under various potential typesof attack.Development scenarios for the Strategic <strong>Nuclear</strong> Missile Forcesin the event of full-scale U.S. ABM deployment were consideredfrom the aspect both of having Soviet combat systems in space andABMs at missile bases, and of not having them. In the extreme case,the total number of launchers could be increased from 1,398 to nearly1,700. The option of deploying up to 1,200 mobile launchers (suchas the Topol or Kurier) for small ICBMs was also considered.There are many reasons why Russia will not implement any of theselarge scale symmetric and asymmetric projects in the foreseeable future,including the collapse of the old Soviet development agenciesand the shortage of resources. However, if the United States proceedswith the deployment of anti-satellite weapons, a certain numberof these projects, especially the asymmetric projects, could still beimplemented, in spite of the heavy financial burden on the budget.The United States began working on anti-satellite systems in 1957.By 1962, it had already developed spacecraft interceptors basedon the Nike Zeus and Thor missiles with nuclear warheads and deployedthem at launch readiness on Johnston Island. There were twosuch anti-satellite systems deployed between 1972 and 1974, whenthey were decommissioned and mothballed.In 1977, work began under the ASAT program on the developmentof a next generation MALS system, which envisioned that F-15fighters would launch Altair short-range attack missiles armed withminiature homing vehicles (MHV) on a vertical trajectory to strikesatellites directly. The reach of the complex in altitude was limitedto 1,000 kilometers. This anti-satellite system passed its flight testsin space between 1984 and 1985 by destroying a real target in space.It was anticipated that the United States would be able to incapacitatebetween three and five low-orbit satellites (below 1,000 kilometers)every 24 to 36 hours.In 1988, for a number of technical and political reasons, the MALSsystem was mothballed. It was anticipated that it could be restoredto combat readiness within a matter of only months. This decisionwith respect to the MALS program did not mean that the United