Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Chapter 10. Non-Strategic <strong>Nuclear</strong> Weapons213ing through globalization, it would be difficult to imagine a singlemotive the United States or its allies might have for attackingRussia (certainly not one that would justify the enormous costs anddangers for all sides).In any case, Russia cannot afford to ignore the trends that havedeveloped to its disfavor in the global and regional balances of conventionaland nuclear forces (even if they largely result from the failuresof its own military reform over the past 15 to 17 years.) The newMilitary Doctrine places a very clear emphasis on these defensive andsecurity problems, and this view cannot be ignored. The way to alleviateRussia’s concerns is not by trying to convince it that the officialRussian perception of the problem has been incorrect; rather, everyeffort must be made to remove such obstacles through agreementsand adjustments to NATO’s military policy.In the first place, considering the internal changes that have takenplace in Ukraine and Georgia’s territorial problems, NATO membershipfor these two countries should be indefinitely delayed. As relationsbetween NATO and Russia and NATO and the CSTO develop(primarily with respect to stabilizing Afghanistan), future expansionof NATO to the east without Russia’s consent should becomeimpossible.Such guarantees would best be incorporated into the newEuropean security system proposed by Russia that would also maintainthe territorial integrity and sovereignty of the post-Soviet states.The military component of such a system could revive the systemand process of conventional forces and weapons reduction and limitationin Europe, a framework that would also be suitable for addressingthe issue of non-expansion of NATO’s infrastructure to theeast. Of critical importance would be the formation of a large jointCSTO-NATO rapid response unit for peacekeeping and other operationsoutside of Europe (including in Afghanistan), and a similarRussia-European Union force for operations on the Europeancontinent.Joint assessment of missile threats and cooperation in developingand deploying U.S.-EU-Russian BMD systems must replace unilateralactions by the United States and its allies in this area.Limits on long-range PGWs have partially been addressed underthe New START Treaty and will be further discussed duringsubsequent negotiations, with the remainder being dealt with in thecontext of a special new series of arms limitation agreements and