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Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

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32<str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Reset</str<strong>on</strong>g>: Arms Reducti<strong>on</strong> and N<strong>on</strong>proliferati<strong>on</strong>Agreement, which was followed by the signature of the New STARTTreaty at the end of 2010.Factors Affecting <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Stability</strong>Until the present time, given the state of c<strong>on</strong>tinued mutual nucleardeterrence between the United States and Russia, strategic stabilityhas been affected by the combined impact of a variety of political,operative, strategic, military, ec<strong>on</strong>omic, and technical factors:• the survivability of strategic nuclear forces;• ballistic missile defense systems;• nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s bel<strong>on</strong>ging to third parties;• c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>ally-armed precisi<strong>on</strong>-guided weap<strong>on</strong>s;• space weap<strong>on</strong>s;• anti-submarine warfare.The survivability of strategic nuclear forces. As noted above,strategic stability is affected first and foremost by the structureof a nati<strong>on</strong>’s nuclear triad and the parameters of the weap<strong>on</strong>sin these groups.Until the mid-1980s, the backb<strong>on</strong>e of the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong>’s potentialin the nuclear balance had been MIRV-ed missile systems in siloshardened to ensure a fairly str<strong>on</strong>g sec<strong>on</strong>d strike capability. Atthe same time, the United States had perceived these as destabilizingsystems that in its view combined a str<strong>on</strong>g counterstrike capabilitywith reduced survivability. Since these interc<strong>on</strong>tinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs) were fitted with multiple reentry vehicles (RVs), just<strong>on</strong>e or two weap<strong>on</strong>s would be sufficient to destroy up to 10 opposingwarheads. The danger of losing so many missiles in <strong>on</strong>e attack couldprompt nati<strong>on</strong>s to deliver a launch-<strong>on</strong>-warning or even preemptivestrike that would threaten to dramatically escalate the situati<strong>on</strong>.Fixed-site ICBMs with single warheads were regarded as c<strong>on</strong>siderablyless destabilizing arms systems. Being vulnerable, these systemscould have still been used to deliver a launch-<strong>on</strong>-warning attack.However, they themselves were relatively low-value targets in anypotential disarming strike.In the meantime, mobile ICBMs and submarines with sealaunchedballistic missiles (SLBMs) were traditi<strong>on</strong>ally recognizedas the most stabilizing weap<strong>on</strong>s systems since they were to providethe main punch of an effective retaliatory strike, making them cen-

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