Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

398<strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Reset</strong>: Arms Reduction and NonproliferationIn deciding whether to ratify the CTBT, Egypt will doubtless considerthe views of the majority of Arab nations, all of which emphasizethe importance of ensuring the universality of not only the CTBTbut also the NPT (and thus regard Israel’s signing of only the CTBTto be insufficient and insist that it must also join the NPT).Israel, however, has clearly spelled out its conditions for ratifyingthe Treaty: first, there must be improvement in the overall situationin the Middle East, including the signing of the NPT by the countriesof the region (Syria and Iraq have not yet signed); second, there mustbe a high level of preparedness and effectiveness on the part of the internationalcompliance verification mechanism established underthe Treaty; and third, Israel must share equal status in the functionsof the regional group of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO.Inasmuch as it is unlikely that any of these conditions will be metwithin the next year or two, the likelihood that Israel will ratifythe Treaty continues to appear rather remote.In Iran, prospects for ratification have also been dependentupon the domestic political factor, as well as the overall situationin the Middle East. Although the number of advocates of social modernizationin Iran has increased, conservative and religious forcescontinue to exert considerable influence in the Majlis, and it is theywho have posed the CTBT ratification issue in the context of endingthe country’s international isolation and expressed doubt thatIran could significantly change the current state of affairs by adoptingthe new WMD nonproliferation obligations. Obviously, the Iranianleadership will not hasten to ratify the CTBT any time soon; it has notyet initiated practical steps to submit the CTBT to the Majlis for consideration.In addition, the complex situation surrounding the Iraniannuclear program (which has obviously been drawing growing internationalconcern) can also not be ignored.Therefore, should the current U.S. administration succeed in ratifyingthe CTBT, considerable forward progress in Treaty ratificationby the remaining “laggards” on the list of 44 countries could beexpected.The CTBT Verification MechanismThe significance of the CTBT is difficult to evaluate absent the compliancecontrol regime (i.e., verification mechanism) stipulated