Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

338<strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Reset</strong>: Arms Reduction and NonproliferationIt would be especially important to agree in advance on actionsto be taken against a regime that violates the NPT while still a memberand then expects to be able to withdraw from the Treaty obligationswith impunity. Since the country would remain responsible forany NPT violations it committed prior to withdrawal, it would seemappropriate to spell out in advance the consequences of such violations.Indeed, the implications of UNSCR 1887 are that additionaldetailed arrangements should follow.The International Commission on <strong>Nuclear</strong> Nonproliferation andDisarmament has recommended that the UNSC should severelydiscourage withdrawal from the NPT by making it clear that suchan act would be regarded by the UNSC as a prima facie threatto international peace and security and would lead to the punitiveconsequences foreseen under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 39 Suchadvance warning about the inevitable consequences that would followacts of proliferation could become an important political deterrentto attempts to use nuclear materials for military purposesA specific step in this direction could be the adoption of a frameworkUNSC resolution (based on and moving forward the relevantprovisions of Resolution 1887) containing specific punitive optionsagainst a proliferator who systematically defies NPT requirementsand the relevant UNSC resolutions.It would also be important to enhance the capabilities of the IAEAto investigate activities that might lead to the development of nuclearweapons. The International Commission on <strong>Nuclear</strong> Nonproliferationand Disarmament has advanced practical recommendations in thisfield proposing to update the Additional Protocol to SafeguardsAgreements by adding to the APSA specific references to dualuseitems, reporting on export denials, shorter notice period, andthe right to interview specific individuals. 40A critical challenge should be addressed, that of elaboratingagreed-upon rules of engagement in situations of imminent threatfrom substate actors (groups of extremists, fanatics, or terroristswho have seized or are about to seize nuclear explosive devices).In the context of promoting UN nonproliferation enforcement arrangements,it would seem pertinent to return to the Russian proposalto revitalize the UNSC Military Staff Committee (MSC) to enhancethe UN’s ability to address new challenges to human security. RussianForeign Minister Sergey Lavrov drew the attention of the UN communityto this issue during the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly.