Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Chapter 4. The Iranian Problem93diaspora presence in most of the developed countries of the world(including Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States)in order to obtain know-how and expertise in the high technologyareas in which it was interested. In 2005, Iranian nationals livingin the United States were arrested for attempting to ship computers,satellite communications equipment, and other technologyto the Islamic Republic illegally. 28The Crisis Surrounding the Iranian <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Program</strong>:From Negotiations to SanctionsThe general outlines of the process that Iran had followed in the nuclearsector over the 1980s-1990s emerged only in 2003-2004, whenthe IAEA began investigating some undeclared Iranian activitiesthat had come to light in 2002. It soon became clear that Iranhad advanced much further in the development of the front-endof the nuclear fuel cycle (including uranium enrichment) than hadbeen generally thought.This had been facilitated by Iran’s initial willingness to cooperate,for example, by allowing IAEA inspectors to visit previously undeclaredsites. A favorable atmosphere for attempting to resolve the crisiswas established by the December 2003 signing of and temporarycompliance with the Additional Protocol to the IAEA SafeguardsAgreement by Iran, and its acceptance of the modified text of Code3.1, which required it to inform the IAEA about the constructionof new facilities as soon as a decision to build them has been made.There was also positive parallel movement in the dialogue betweenthe European troika of intermediaries (France, Germany, and GreatBritain) and Iran.However, the preference of the George W. Bush administrationfor using pressure, isolation, and sanctions against Iran to win concessionsin the uranium enrichment question and its unwillingnessto compromise became yet another obstacle to finding a resolutionto the crisis. It became the primary goal of the U.S. administrationto punish Iran for conducting nuclear activities not declaredto the IAEA, rather than to establish an environment that would beconducive to the investigation of such activity by the IAEA.Washington missed a unique opportunity to improve the situationmarkedly and to establish a qualitatively new level of trust