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Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

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Chapter 2. The Modern Arsenals of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> States49At the official level, both France and Great Britain have beenquite open about the status and development of their nuclear arsenals(both sea- and air-based), but while reporting the total numberof deployed nuclear warheads, neither country publishes data aboutthe actual number of warheads <strong>on</strong> deployed submarine-launchedballistic missiles (SLBMs). The discussi<strong>on</strong> of these issues at the expertlevel in these countries is much narrower than it is in Russia, letal<strong>on</strong>e the United States. Great Britain has been the most open of allthe nuclear powers with regard to its stored nuclear warheads andmaterials, as it has been for the entire history of its nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>sproducti<strong>on</strong>.The People’s Republic of China has been completely closed in termsof official informati<strong>on</strong> available about its nuclear forces, as well asabout its development programs and reserve capabilities. China hasexplained this by the need to protect its “nuclear deterrence” interestsin light of its relatively “weak” strategic potential. Rather than factualinformati<strong>on</strong>, Beijing issues numerous declarati<strong>on</strong>s about the “strictlydefensive” nature of China’s nuclear forces and the “minimal deterrence”principle behind its strategy. Most recently, a bit more informati<strong>on</strong>about the Chinese nuclear force alert c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong>s andoperating c<strong>on</strong>cept has appeared at the unofficial level (sancti<strong>on</strong>ed bythe authorities, of course), but the reliability of this informati<strong>on</strong> israther uncertain. In c<strong>on</strong>trast to its extremely “modest” strategic declarati<strong>on</strong>s,at the October 1, 2009, military parade marking China’s 60year anniversary, China was clearly trying to make an internati<strong>on</strong>alimpressi<strong>on</strong> as a burge<strong>on</strong>ing military power, <strong>on</strong>e with strategic nucleararms. For obvious reas<strong>on</strong>s there have been no free discussi<strong>on</strong>s of thissubject by the country’s expert community.At the official level, India and Pakistan have remained as secretiveabout their nuclear forces and programs as China. At the sametime, both nati<strong>on</strong>s devote a great deal of attenti<strong>on</strong> to the phrasingand nuances of their nuclear deterrence doctrines.Israel does not publish any official data about its nuclear forceseither, officially even refusing to c<strong>on</strong>sider itself a nuclear-weap<strong>on</strong>state. However, Israel has clearly also been trying to follow a lineof “virtual nuclear deterrence” by encouraging unofficial discussi<strong>on</strong>of its nuclear forces, systems, programs, and strategic c<strong>on</strong>cepts bothinside the country and abroad.North Korea has officially announced its involvement in boththe testing and serial producti<strong>on</strong> of nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s, but for ob-

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