Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Chapter 1. Deterrence and Strategic Stability33tral to the nation’s nuclear deterrence while (until recently) playingno significant role in disarmament capabilities.In truth, before START I, the United States had also consideredthe verification difficulties presented by mobile ICBMs to bea negative attribute that provided an opportunity to secretly buildup missiles, deploy missile launchers in mountain ranges, and so on.These very concerns had led to the introduction of additional accounting,inspection, and notification rules for mobile ICBMs.As far as ballistic missile submarines are concerned, beginningin the mid-1980s the Trident II SLBMs with W-88 warheads beganto pose a major threat to Soviet (Russian) ICBMs and thus becamea significant destabilizing factor. Only the U.S. decision not to deploymore than 400 W-88 warheads helped to diminish this destabilizingimpact. However, it may increase again in the future asRussia continues its deep fixed-site and mobile ICBM reductions.Experts also periodically discuss the destabilizing role of ballisticmissile submarines and heavy bombers stationed at a limited numberof bases during peacetime, because these two categories of weaponshave a high concentration of warheads and represent attractive targetsfor a disarming strike. However, during periods of threat (whichunder any realistic scenarios of conflict would inevitably precedemilitary action with any types of weapons), submarines would departfor their patrol zones and heavy bombers would be dispersedto a large number of reserve airfields to remain on standby for takeoff.As a result, their destabilizing impact cannot be considered asbeing significant.Ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems can either undermineor enhance strategic stability. They can undermine strategic stabilityif they create an increased risk of a disarming strike by protectinga country that initiates it against a massive retaliation by interceptinga substantial portion of the incoming missiles and warheads,but they can help to maintain strategic stability when they protectthe bases of ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, strategic aviation,and command and control centers, and nothing more.This was the principle guiding the United States and the SovietUnion during their conclusion of the 1972 ABM Treaty and its 1974Protocol.At the same time, as the BMD communications and weapons systemsbecame more technologically advanced, their capabilities expandedto a point that, for example, two regions of Ground-Based