Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

388<strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Reset</strong>: Arms Reduction and Nonproliferationassumed that the main provisions of the Treaty could be negotiatedas early as the spring of 1995 to expedite the permanent extensionof the NPT.The key components and primary problem areas in the futureTreaty were quickly identified at the very beginning of these negotiations;the most significant of these related to the scope of itsapplicability and methods of implementation, including the creationof the Comprehensive <strong>Nuclear</strong> Test Ban Treaty Organization,the conditions under which it would take effect, the duration of validityandthe conditions for withdrawing from the Treaty. One especiallycomplex and large group of issues related to the verificationof CTBT compliance.With regard to the scope of applicability, the problem involvedidentifying the specific activities to be banned under the Treaty andthe boundaries of such prohibition. In the practical sense, this relatedin particular to the issue of the permissibility of peaceful nucleardetonations, which China favored, but France, Great Britain,the United States, and almost all of the non-nuclear states involvedin the negotiations opposed. The arguments against allowing peacefulnuclear explosions revolved around the possible military advantagethat could be concealed in such explosions, the absence of awell-reasoned verification mechanism to exclude such advantage,the danger of adverse ecological consequences from radioactive contamination,and the lack of any actual projects that would have anysignificant economic benefit.Another illustration of the complexity of the problem of identifyingthe boundaries of the Treaty’s scope of application may be seenin the position taken by some of the nations of the Non-AlignedMovement when they demanded that the ban apply not only to nucleardetonations, but also to the non-explosive weapons activity thatostensibly allowed the nuclear powers to create new types of nuclearweapons without carrying out test detonations. On the other hand,the need for the nuclear powers to maintain the reliability and safetyof their existing arsenals required them to carry out correspondingactivities that, at the very least, were near threshold in nature.At the initial stage, these concerns were reflected by the positionsof France and Great Britain, which advocated the right of the nuclearpowers to conduct full-scale testing under limited conditions. This,however, was not supported by the other members of the “nuclearclub” (not to mention the non-nuclear countries), and was dropped.