Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

Conclusion511tion of missiles and nuclear weapons has diminished the willingnessof the great powers to pursue any further nuclear disarmament andprompted them to withdraw from existing treaties (ABM or INF).The current system of limits on the proliferation of missiles andrelated technology does not allow such developments to be effectivelycountered. In order to address this problem, the effectivenessof the missile nonproliferation regime urgently needs to be improved,beginning by elevating the status of the Missile TechnologyControl Regime (MTCR) and the International Code of ConductAgainst Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC). Simultaneously,looking to the long term, it would be expedient to prepare a drafttreaty that would integrate the MTCR, ICOC, and the GlobalControl System (GCS). Such a treaty would be modeled afterthe NPT and would serve as the basis for a new global and legallybinding missile nonproliferation regime.The chance that weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclearweapons, could be acquired by terrorists poses one of the most urgentthreats to international security. Overcoming this threat willrequire closer cooperation between the secret services, special forces,law enforcement agencies, and the armed forces of Russia, the UnitedStates, and other states. Countries will also need to improve theirnational legislation to enhance the security of their nuclear materialsand facilities. In accordance with the results of the Washington<strong>Nuclear</strong> Security Summit of April 2010, the standards adopted bythe leading powers for physical security, protection, accounting, andcontrol of the nuclear materials and facilities should be accepted byall countries conducting such activities. To these ends, they shouldbe provided with financial and technical assistance, and the <strong>Nuclear</strong>Suppliers Group should resolve to make all future contracts on peacefulnuclear cooperation subject to the adoption and implementationof these standards by the states involved.Four. Until it expired on December 2009, the START I Treatybetween the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States had beenunprecedented in its historical role. It had provided strategic stabilityunder the exceedingly complex conditions that followed the endof the Cold War, ensured the continuity of full-format cooperationbetween the two nations in the sphere of nuclear weapons reduction,and allowed Russia to retain strategic parity with the United Statesat a critical time for its strategic nuclear forces. START I becamethe international legal foundation for the process of nuclear disar-