Nuclear Reset - Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE)

376<strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Reset</strong>: Arms Reduction and NonproliferationMilitary and Technical Aspects of NFUThe United States and Russia do not have now, nor are they likelyto have any time soon, an ability to carry out a disarming strike,since under any scenario either nation would retain enough weaponsto deliver a destructive counterstrike against the other. The essenceof maintaining strategic stability is to preserve this situationat lower force levels through new disarmament agreements. In thisway, a pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons between the UnitedStates and Russia could be guaranteed in terms of strategic weaponsnot on words alone, but also on a military and technical basis. Noconceivable U.S. BMD or air defense system could possibly alter thissituation for the foreseeable future as long as Russia maintains a sufficientretaliatory potential with account taken of the U.S. nuclearcounterforce capabilities.France and Great Britain also lack a capability of carrying outa disarming strike against Russia, whether independently or jointlywith the United States, while Russia for its part would also be incapableof destroying the relatively small but highly-survivable strategicforces of the two nations. Moreover, their security is also guaranteedby U.S. obligations within the NATO framework. Thus, thereis a military and technical component for NFU existing at the levelof strategic nuclear weapons in the context of Russian relations withFrance and Great Britain, as well.In terms of Russian-Chinese strategic relations, Russia continuesfor the time being to enjoy a large military superiority (includinga considerable counterforce capability), which it is likely to retainfor at least the next decade. However, as the Chinese mobile missileforces continue to develop (and considering their intermediaterange systems), the military and technical basis for a mutual NFUwould also be strengthened in Russian-Chinese relations. In China’srelations with France and Great Britain, a mutual obligation notto use nuclear weapons first would be a product of the fact that theirterritories remain beyond the reach of the greater part of the other’sstrategic forces.The United States enjoys a massive nuclear advantage over Chinathat it will retain for the foreseeable future, including significantcounterforce capabilities. However, China’s ability to deliver a secondstrike will also gradually increase, adding to the capabilities