The world according to Monsanto : pollution, corruption, and

the bovine growth hormone affair, part one 105der, a reduction in gestation time and in the weight of calves, a higher rateof twins, an increase in mastitis and SCC, and abscesses of one to twoinches and sometimes as much as four inches, at injection sites. Hardly ofminor importance.Michael Hansen of the Consumer Policy Institute explained that rBGH“is the most controversial product ever authorized by the FDA.” “You have tounderstand that the transgenic hormone is not a drug designed to treat anycattle disease, but a product with a strictly economic purpose which has nobenefit for either animals or consumers. The agency should therefore haverequired that it be totally harmless before approving its sale. Instead, it acknowledgedthat it might pose countless health problems by creating a newcriterion, which violated the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: ‘manageablerisk.’” An internal FDA document reveals that at a meeting on March 31,1993, the CVM concluded that the risks the transgenic hormone posed forhuman and animal health were “manageable” and that the agency shouldtherefore proceed to its approval. According to Hansen, “the agency surreptitiouslychanged its regulatory criteria to satisfy the needs of Monsanto,which had been able to maneuver very cleverly by placing some of its representativesin key positions in the agency.” This was a perfect illustration ofthe revolving door, the hiring of private industry employees by governmentagencies and vice versa. Later on, I will discuss more thoroughly this nationalpastime, at which Monsanto is unquestionably a master, even consideringonly the case of rBGH. For example, it turns out that one of the hiddenauthors of the controversial article published by the FDA in Science was SusanSechen, a former student of Dale Baumann (the principal reviewer ofthe article), who, you will recall, had been paid by Monsanto to test thetransgenic hormone at Cornell University. After writing her dissertation onrBGH, Sechen had been hired by the CVM to evaluate the data provided bythe company. Her supervisor was Margaret Miller, who had worked forMonsanto from 1985 to 1989 before becoming assistant to Dr. Robert Livingston,head of the CVM’s Office of New Animal Drug Evaluation.Miller’s presence in such a strategic position had in fact created somecontroversy. On March 16, 1994—the date Posilac came on the market—CVM employees wrote an anonymous letter to David Kessler, the FDAcommissioner, with copies to the GAO and to Consumers Union: “We areafraid to speak openly about the situation because of retribution from our director,Dr. Robert Livingston, who openly harasses anyone who states an