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cedents which are not beliefs, nor indeed psychical events of
any kind, but belong wholly to the nonrational world of matter
and motion.” (Footnote 5: Balfour, Theism and Thought, p. 21.)
since all our beliefs are thus determined by nonrational
causes beyond our control, they are all open to theoretical
doubt. But despite these skeptical considerations, we have a
practical need for beliefs in the guidance of life: we therefore
accept beliefs on valuational grounds precisely because of our
subjective needs. (Footnote 6: Foundations, passim; cf. Macintosh,
p. 308.)
The resultant argument for God.---What are the implications
of Balfour’s analysis with respect to the knowledge of God?
Wall, in the first place, the most that we can claim for theism,
on an argumentative basis, is that it embodies reasonable
religious belief. Religious and scientific faith stand on equal
footing from a theoretical point of view: strictly speaking,
knowledge is impossible in both cases. Yet just as this fact
does not impede our acceptance of scientific dicta, neither
should it prevent our espousal of religious [[Page 148]] faith, if,
like science, that faith is workable in maintaining the value of
our highest beliefs. (Footnote 7: Theism and Thought, pp. 249,
250, et passim.)
To put the matter more positively, we must choose between
theism, on the one hand, and the consignment of the whole
body of our reflective beliefs to meaninglessness, on the other:
if we are to believe in anything, we must believe in God. (Footnote
8: Foundations, pp. 331, 332.)
All our beliefs are determined ultimately by factors which in
their natural context, are nonrational; this we have already seen.
Now the naturalistic position “rejects the notion that these nonrational
beginnings are, or ever have been, subjected to rational
guidance.” (Footnote 9: Theism and Thought, p. 22.) Thus science,
if committed to naturalism, admits “the unqualified nonrationality
of its own origins.” (Footnote 10: Idem.)