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sistent with this attribute, since the use of means implies limitation
of power. Thus Mill points out:
[indent] Every indication of Design in the Kosmos is so
much evidence against the omnipotence of the designer. For
what is meant by design? Contrivance: the adaptation of means
to an end. But the necessity for contrivance---the need of employing
means---is a consequence of the limitation of power. . .
. Who would have recourse to means if to attain his end his
mere word was sufficient? . . . The evidences, therefore, of
Natural Theology distinctly imply that the Author of the Kosmos
worked under limitations; that he was obliged to adapt
himself to conditions independent of his will. . . . (Footnote 76:
Mill, op. cit., pp. 75, 76.)
And Russell bitingly remarks: “The conception of purpose is a
natural one to apply to a human artificer. . . . But Omnipotence
is subject to no such limitations [as a human artificer]. If God
really things well of the human race . . . why not proceed, as in
Genesis, to create man at once?” (Footnote 77: Religion and
Science, pp. 193, 194.) The use of means to attain an end
would thus seem to outlaw omnipotence: and thus theism, in the
fullest sense, is unjustified by the very design argument which
purports to support it.
In answer: this objection has already been refuted by implication
in our answer to objections against the cosmological argument
and in our answer to the expansive-limiting argument
of presuppositionalism. In the latter context, we attempted to
show that the hypothesis of a finite ultimate, or of a plurality of
infinite ultimates, is logically self-contradictory and therefore
rationally untenable. Yet it is the very conception of a plurality
of ultimates that the present objection embodies, since it implies
that God works under conditions which are extraneously
applied and imposed. In the former [[327]] context, it was es-