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sequence must depend on a nontemporal cause, the world cannot<br />

be said to be an effect. Laird argues similarly but fails, in<br />

his formulation of the objection, to push his point to the final<br />

form, since he mentions only that "we have no experience of<br />

anything that came before the world." (Footnote 20: Laird, op.<br />

cit., p. 96.) But in the next place, since the world---in the largest<br />

sense of the term---is unique, there is likewise no basis in an<br />

experience of repeated events for affirming that it is an effect.<br />

If we infer causal connection only from experience of repeatable<br />

sequences, how can we infer anything about the unique<br />

world-whole as an effect? (Footnote 21: Burtt, op. cit., p. 219<br />

(<strong>com</strong>menting on Hume).) The out<strong>com</strong>e of our analysis is that<br />

the cosmological argument is invalid, since, when the scientific<br />

concept of causality is applied, no inference can be drawn that<br />

the world is an effect: yet the argument depends on this very<br />

inference.<br />

In answer to the objection: does the scientific concept of<br />

causality purport, at the outset, to be a <strong>com</strong>plete explanation of<br />

the causal origin of a given event or entity? It is true that science<br />

is interested in that aspect of the causal nexus, underlying<br />

a given event, which is the antecedent whose presence always<br />

involves the presence of the effect and whose absence always<br />

involves the absence of the effect. But this interest springs<br />

from the practical motive for scientific pursuits, the scientist being<br />

interested primarily in controlling natural [[290]] sequences<br />

to bring about some events and prevent others. This certainly<br />

does not mean, however, that there are no other causal factors<br />

operating: while it may be true, for example, that heat is always<br />

present subsequent upon the presence of motion and absent<br />

when motion is thus absent, this does not mean that the presence<br />

of motion is the whole explanation of any particular instance<br />

of heat; it merely means that it is the factor of interest to<br />

the person who wishes, in any given case, to produce or prevent<br />

heat. But does anyone imagine that heat or anything else of

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