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le, then we could not say that the absolutely necessary being
transcends the temporal series and we would still fall short of
theism. Now consider this proposed possibility.
If such a being is subject to succession of temporal moments,
this succession of moments, this succession of moments
must either be a self-involved subjection of one that arises from
some extraneous cause. But in the latter case, as we indicated
above, such a being is not an absolutely necessary being. In the
former case, this self-involved subjection to time must spring
either from a changeless or a changeable determinate condition
in the absolute being. In the last instance---that the determinate
condition is changeable---we contradict the original hypothesis
that the absolutely necessary being is changeless in its essential
nature, since any determinate condition in such a being must be
part of its essential nature.
In the first instance---that the determinate condition from
which subjection to time springs is changeless---the subjection
itself would be eternal. Now this would mean that the eternity
of the absolutely necessary being would consist in an infinite
series of successive moments: and we have already shown that
such an infinite series is rationally inconceivable. Furthermore,
if the determinate condition from which subjection to time
springs is changeless, then self-contradiction results: for the
condition, being itself a part of the nature of the absolutely necessary
being, would itself be subject to time and would therefore
change by passing through a succession of moments. This
would yield then the curious result that the alleged changeless
condition is a changeable and changing condition---which is
self-contradictory.
It therefore follows that since an absolutely necessary being
cannot be subject to temporal succession either from a selfinvolved
or extraneous cause, such a being must completely
transcend the temporal series.