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jectively true, then it is merely an assertion of the subjectivist's<br />

feelings and can lay no claim to philosophical acceptance as an<br />

ethical theory. If it is objectively true, then the relativists "contradict<br />

their own position, which is a denial of any universal<br />

truth in moral matters." (Footnote 11: C. H. Patterson, Moral<br />

Standards, p. 63.)<br />

Nor is there any escape in terms of the suggestion that the<br />

state- [[238]] ment of the theory is not an ethical statement: for<br />

every alleged true statement is actually ethical in character.<br />

When I say that a proposition is true, I mean that a rational man<br />

ought to believe it because it is supported by rational evidence.<br />

Truth, in other words, is among the values that would be made<br />

subjective by a relativist theory. Consequently, it turns out that<br />

if relativism is taken as objectively true, it is false by its own<br />

assertion---which is self-contradictory.<br />

(b) Second, the same point may be set in a slightly different<br />

context. If values are wholly relative to the individual valuer,<br />

there is no way of explaining how two persons can differ concerning<br />

an ethical question, or any other question, for that matter.<br />

The fact is that men do dispute such problems: even the<br />

relativist himself is disputing ethical problems in propounding<br />

his theory. But that ethical problems may be thus disputed assumes<br />

that ethical statements do have objective reference to an<br />

ultimate end which is intrinsically valuable: otherwise, debate<br />

would be impossible, just as it is impossible to debate with a<br />

man who says: I like carrots. (Footnote 12: Cf. D. E. Trueblood,<br />

The Logic of Belief, pp. 167, 168.)<br />

If the hedonist and the humanist, in ethics, disagree about<br />

the nature of the good, it is not that either of them "intends<br />

something else in using the term 'good' but that, addressing<br />

himself t the intrinsically desirable, he reads the nature of it differently.<br />

Otherwise, no debatable issue would lie between these<br />

points of view." (Footnote 13: C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of<br />

Knowledge and Valuation, p. x.)

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